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        1 - Time in the View of Islamic Philosophers and Theologians
        Maqsud  Mohammadi
        One of the most important philosophical problems which has been discussed and explored in both physics and theology is time. A few theologians have considered time to be a non-existent entity and an illusion. However, those theologians and philosophers who view time as More
        One of the most important philosophical problems which has been discussed and explored in both physics and theology is time. A few theologians have considered time to be a non-existent entity and an illusion. However, those theologians and philosophers who view time as an existential entity have presented various theories regarding the way of its existence and its truth. A group of theologians believe that time is an illusory thing, that is, it lacks an objective referent in the outside but has an origin of abstraction. Nevertheless, those who attribute an objective existence to time can be divided into two groups: some consider it to be an immaterial substance, and some others believe that it is a material and corporeal substance. However, the dominant theory holds that time enjoys an objective existence under the category of “quantity”; in other words, it is a “non-static continuous quantity” which is equal to the amount of motion in a sense, and the number of motion in another sense. Time measures the amount of motion over a specific distance. In fact, the relation of time to motion is similar to the relation of mathematical body to physical body. As a mathematical body grants determination to the ambiguous dimensions of a physical body, time also determines the amount of motion. Among all thinkers, Mulla Sadra treats this issue more meticulously and introduces time as the fourth dimension of material existents. This paper analyzes the various views of Muslim philosophers and theologians regarding time. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Mulla Sadra’s View of Time in the Hereafter
        Hadi  Jafary Furugh al-Sadat  Rahimpoor
        The attention to the specific features of the Hereafter, such as time, and its comparison with worldly conditions can be witnessed in many of Mulla Sadra’s works. Given the presupposition that corporeal resurrection and the existence of other-worldly body are necessary More
        The attention to the specific features of the Hereafter, such as time, and its comparison with worldly conditions can be witnessed in many of Mulla Sadra’s works. Given the presupposition that corporeal resurrection and the existence of other-worldly body are necessary in the Transcendent Philosophy, the question is whether time also exists in the Hereafter. If the answer is yes, what are its qualities and quantities, and how does it differ from worldly time? The present paper is intended to provide some responses to such questions about time and concludes that the existence of a kind of time which matches the Hereafter and the other-worldly corporeal existence is necessary for believing in corporeal resurrection. This kind of time enjoys a more perfect and intensive level of the worldly existence of time and possesses some other-worldly features such as the relativity of feeling the passage of time, influence of the extent and level of individual’s immateriality in the slowness or speed of the passage of time during other-worldly events, and correspondence of the perception of passage of time with the domination of angelic aspect over each individual (in the course of worldly life). Manuscript profile
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        3 - An Analysis of the Relationship between Chimeric Time and Temporal Origination in the View of Mutikallimun
        Alireza  Kohansal M‘asoomeh Sadat  Sary Arefi
        The problem of the origination and eternity of the world has always been one of the most challenging topics of debate among Muslim philosophers and mutikallimun. This issue is closely related to different problems such as explaining the divine essence, attributes of kno More
        The problem of the origination and eternity of the world has always been one of the most challenging topics of debate among Muslim philosophers and mutikallimun. This issue is closely related to different problems such as explaining the divine essence, attributes of knowledge, power and will, the relationship between attributes and essence, cause-effect necessity, the relationship between the perfect cause and effect, the criteria for the need of effect for a cause, determinant of the origination of the world, and the nature of time, place, etc. Early Muslim philosophers believed in the eternity of the world, which, in the view of Muslim mutikallimun, was inconsistent with religious verses and teachings. Given the literal meaning of Qur’anic verses and their own specific interpretation of the essence and attributes of knowledge and the divine power and free will, they brought faith in the temporal origination of the world. In order to justify this view, mutikallimun imagined a time at which the world did not exist but came into existence later. This time was named the “chimeric time”. The present study explores the relationship between the theory of chimeric time and temporal origination in the view of Muslim mutikallimun. Ultimately, it becomes clear that chimeric time is, firstly, based on the same general principles of the design of temporal origination. Secondly, it has been introduced in order to improve the idea of temporal origination in terms of structure and respond to philosophers’ related criticisms. At the same time, this theory is consistent with other aspects of kalami thoughts, such as the common view of the world, its relationship with God, and the lack of its demonstrative analysis. Generally speaking, in spite of the different and, at times, contradictory interpretations of this theory, it is yet a step forward in propounding the temporal origination of the world, which entails the idea of a time in conformity with various ontological worlds. Manuscript profile
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        4 - A Study of Qaysari’s View of the Reality of Gnostic Time
        Hassan  Moradi mahmoud saidi
        Qaysari was one of the most prominent commentators of Ibn Arabi’s school. He also developed a specific theory about time based on gnostic principles. His view in this regard consists of some sections: a criticism of philosophical theories, particularly, those of Aristot More
        Qaysari was one of the most prominent commentators of Ibn Arabi’s school. He also developed a specific theory about time based on gnostic principles. His view in this regard consists of some sections: a criticism of philosophical theories, particularly, those of Aristotle and Ibn Sina; gnostic interpretation of certain philosophical theories, and an explanation of the reality of time and its divisions based on gnostic principles. However, there are some problems with Qaysari’s objections to Ibn Sina’s view and his gnostic interpretations of some philosophical theories. The most important problem of his theory concerns his hadith-based proofs about the emergence of time through resorting to al-dahr (Perpetual Duration), which is one of God’s names. This is because the hadiths referred to by Qaysari are not valid enough and cannot be used to demonstrate his claim. Accordingly, it can be said that time emerges by resorting to God’s name of al-muqaddar (Determiner), and its emergence at different levels creates the divine day and night. Manuscript profile
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        5 - A Comparative Study of the Whatness of Time and the Temporal Origination of the World in Fakhr al-Din Razi and Mulla Sadra
        Seyyed Mohammad Esmaeil  Seyyed Hashemi Seyyed Mohammad Javad  Seyyed Hashemi
        One of the most important issues which should be addressed before examining the arguments on the originatedness or temporal pre-eternity of the world is what mutikallimun and philosophers mean by originatedness and temporal eternity. This question by itself is based on More
        One of the most important issues which should be addressed before examining the arguments on the originatedness or temporal pre-eternity of the world is what mutikallimun and philosophers mean by originatedness and temporal eternity. This question by itself is based on another question as to what they mean by time. Owing to his mastery of kalami and philosophical views and following a critical approach, Fakhr al-Din Razi analyzes and compares the views of mutikallimun and philosophers about the originatedness and temporal pre-eternity of the world and their arguments in this regard and critically reviews the roots and the conceptual and assertoric principles of the two sides with respect to this issue. He believes that mutikallimun’s interpretation of time and temporal origination is absurd. Moreover, he rejects philosophers’ definition of time as to the amount of motion and a continuous quantity and, unlike the common belief, maintains that time is a disjunctive quantity. In contrast to other mutikallimun, he doubts the temporal originatedness of the world of intellects and immaterial entities. Nevertheless, by criticizing the ideas of early mutikallimun and philosophers, Mulla Sadra tries to bring the views of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek philosophers and followers of other religions in unison with his own ideas, while his interpretation of temporal origination and his fundamental philosophical principles are not consistent with such a unison. This is because the concept of Sadrian temporal originatedness is based on the principiality of existence and trans-substantial motion, which were discussed neither in Greek philosophy nor tackled by Islamic mutikallimun. This paper does not intend to evaluate the arguments on origination or pre-eternity; rather, it explores the whatness of origination or temporal pre-eternity in Mulla Sadra and Fakhr al-Din Razi. The authors believe that their shared objection to mutikallimun and Peripatetic philosophers concerns their interpretation of time and temporal origination. However, the difference between these two thinkers arises from their own conceptions of the whatness of time and temporal origination. Manuscript profile
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        6 - A Study of the Attribution of the Theory of Perpetual Createdness to Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī
        Hossein Najafi Hamed Naji Esfahani
        The belief in the createdness of the world is the essence of a proposition which, after believing in the One God, is the most significant of all divine beliefs. Mīr Dāmād’s particular view in this regard entails the demonstration of a real commencement and trans-tempora More
        The belief in the createdness of the world is the essence of a proposition which, after believing in the One God, is the most significant of all divine beliefs. Mīr Dāmād’s particular view in this regard entails the demonstration of a real commencement and trans-temporal origination for the world of being. Through referring to the failure of his preceding philosophers regarding the rational explanation of the problem of the appearance of the world, Mīr Dāmād maintains that the content of the modified version of the theory of “perpetual createdness” (ḥudūth dahrī) is among his innovations and the most important fruit of Yamani wisdom. On the other hand, Mullā Moḥammad Ismā‘īl Khwajūī in his treatise of Ibṭāl al-zamān al-mawhūm attributes this theory to Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī, matches his view with the theory of perpetual createdness and, in this way, implies that Mīr Dāmād adopted this theory from Dawānī’s works. The present study examines Khwajūī’s claim through investigating a number of metaphysical analyses. Manuscript profile
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        7 - From Wisdom to Functionalism: A New Analysis of the Nature of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophical Paradigm
        Hassan Rahbar Hamid  Eskandari
        The nature of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical paradigm as a comprehensive system of philosophy has always been investigated by researchers in related fields. So far, eight views have been proposed in this regard; some of them consider Mullā Ṣadrā’s school to be a philosophi More
        The nature of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical paradigm as a comprehensive system of philosophy has always been investigated by researchers in related fields. So far, eight views have been proposed in this regard; some of them consider Mullā Ṣadrā’s school to be a philosophical one; some others view it as a gnostic one, while others attribute a kalāmī nature to it. Nevertheless, his words and writings contradict these views. He mainly prefers to call his system of thoughts “wisdom”, which means the knowledge of God and His attributes and acts based on a mixed kalāmī-gnostic method. However, the writer believes that wisdom has no independent identity distinguishing it from philosophy, kalām, and gnosis and cannot be deemed as an independent school. Accordingly, in order to provide an accurate explanation of his system of thoughts, in addition to internal and content-based analyses, one should observe the external features of the world Mullā Ṣadrā lived in. Hence, from an external perspective, it apparently follows “consensus-creating functionalism”; that is, his school seeks to create functional unity among the three systems of thought. From an external perspective, it follows an anthropological life-course approach; in other words, one should consider the various philosophical, social, and political conditions of his time in explaining the discussions, problems, and methods embedded in his system of thinking. Accordingly, the writer believes that three points should be considered in adopting an optimal approach to examining the Sadrian system of thought: the distinction between the truths about the intellect and the truths about faith, omission of what is inconsistent with philosophical method, and distinguishing the borderlines of intellect from those of narration and gnosis. In this paper, while presenting Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of his own school, it has been tried to clarify Sadrian thoughts based on their internal content and external conditions in order to provide a new analysis of his thought system. Manuscript profile
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        8 - A Comparative Study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s and William Craig’s Views of Temporal Origination of the World
        Monireh  Sayyid Mazhari Alireza  Esmaeli
        One of the most profound ontological problems which has occupied the minds of thinkers and philosophers is the discussion of origination or eternity of the world. In Islamic tradition, through introducing the theory of trans-substantial motion, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to More
        One of the most profound ontological problems which has occupied the minds of thinkers and philosophers is the discussion of origination or eternity of the world. In Islamic tradition, through introducing the theory of trans-substantial motion, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to portray the renewing origination of the material world in such a way that, while enjoying consistency, it does not contradict any religious teachings. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, renewal is the same as existents’ being, and each renewal is an independent origination which ceaselessly occurs in the essence of existents in the course of time. The chain of events will never stop at a specific point due to the continuity of emanation; therefore, all components of the world are temporally originated. As a result, the world, as a mentally-posited whole, has no independent existence and is temporally originated as well. William Craig, the Christian thinker, has also based his cosmological argument on a new approach to the temporal origination of the world in the contemporary Western philosophical atmosphere. He maintains that the world and all its constituent parts, including time, have been created from nothing at a specific moment on divine free will and, since then, God, who existed prior to the creation of the world in an ethereal state, is now exposed to time because of His true relationship with temporal origination of things. The present study aims to reveal the efficiency of Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretation of the temporal origination of the world in comparison to Craig’s new approach. The findings of this comparison indicate that Craig’s attempts at presenting this new approach deserve due attention; however, comparing to Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, it not only lacks the necessary consistency but is also in clear contrast to some of the most fundamental religious theorems including the impossibility of attributing change to God’s essence, His eternity, His everlasting simultaneity with the created, and continuity of emanation. Manuscript profile
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        9 - Circularity of the Definitions of Nature and Truth of Time in Ibn Sīnā’s View
        Hamid  Shahriari
        Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khān More
        Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khānsārī, believe that the circular nature of Ibn Sīnā’s definition of time in this book poses no problem because the concept of time is an axiom, and the existence of circularity in the definition of an axiom is natural. His other definition has been given in al-Shifā. Here, the nature of time is defined in the sense of a measure of motion as divided into prior and posterior components. In this definition, time contains disjunctive quantity (time as the number of motion) in addition to continuous quantity (time as amount of motion). The present paper aims to provide a clear picture of the definition of the nature of time in Ibn Sīnā’s view in his al-Ishārāt and al-Shifā in al-Ṭabi’iyyāt chapter. Following an analytic comparative study of Ibn Sīnā’s works, the author concludes that Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s perception of Ibn Sīnā’s definitions of the nature of time were not inconsistent and, rather, he intended to provide another analysis of the truth of time. Manuscript profile
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        10 - Mullā Ṣadrā and the Problem of Imaginary Time
        Huda Habibimanesh shamsollah seraj Maijd  Ziaei
        One of the most controversial philosophical-kalami issues in the history of Islamic philosophy has always been the analysis of the problem of the origination and pre-eternity of the world. Most Muslim mutikallimūn believe in the temporal origination of the world and con More
        One of the most controversial philosophical-kalami issues in the history of Islamic philosophy has always been the analysis of the problem of the origination and pre-eternity of the world. Most Muslim mutikallimūn believe in the temporal origination of the world and consider the pre-universe time to be “imaginary”. As the most supreme philosopher of the Transcendent Philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā has also discussed imaginary time in different places in his works. He has adopted two different approaches to this theory but does not express his view explicitly. The present study explains Mullā Ṣadrā’s opinions regarding the theory of imaginary time and his two approaches in this respect in order to answer the question of what his ultimate standpoint regarding imaginary time is. In order to accomplish this task, the authors have referred to the scattered discussions in his works and, after studying and explaining the relationships between them and combining them with each other, have provided a description of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ultimate view. Although in some places he tries to justify the theory of imaginary time based on his own principles, given his explicit statements on negating an intermediary between the world of being and Almighty Necessary as well as his demonstration of the existence of time and rejection of the arguments of deniers of time, it can be concluded that his ultimate view here is the negation of imaginary time. Manuscript profile