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        1 - سرمقاله
        Seyyed Mohammad Khamenei
      • Open Access Article

        2 - A Critique of “the Methodological Role of the Principle of Nothing Proceeds from the One but the One”
        Mahdi  ‘Azimi
        “The Methodological Role of the Principle of Nothing Proceeds from the One but the One” is the title of an article the writer of which believes that the explanation of this principle is limited to a number of problems in the field of metaphysics in its particular sense. More
        “The Methodological Role of the Principle of Nothing Proceeds from the One but the One” is the title of an article the writer of which believes that the explanation of this principle is limited to a number of problems in the field of metaphysics in its particular sense. Therefore, any reference to it “in order to demonstrate logical and natural problems and some problems in metaphysics in its general sense” is unjustified. In this paper, in response to the above claim, the writer shows: 1) this idea was initially proposed by Mulla Sadra and later evaluated and developed by Hakim Sabziwari (although the article mentioned above refers to Mulla Sadra’s view and Sabziwari’s evaluation and development of this view, it does not provide any response to it); 2) the origin of this view neglects the limit of modal unity; 3) all through this article the true One is mixed with the one truth; 4) in the mentioned article, the original principle and its opposite are intermingled, and the claim of the original principle also effects its opposite, and 5) the writer of the same article considers the “impossibility of inferring a single concept from multiple referents” to be one example of the false applications of the principle of “Nothing proceeds from the One but the One”, whereas philosophers have not resorted to this principle in this regard. It seems that this error originates in equating the relationship between the concept and the referent with causality. Even if we assume that it is correct, it is better to say that this problem is based on the opposite of this principle rather than its original form. However, the claim made in the article, if assumed correct, entails the original principle and not its opposite. Moreover, the mentioned problem is not even based on the opposite of the principle. Manuscript profile
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        3 - Semantics of the Appellation “Necessary Being in itself”
        Seyyed Mohammad  Entezam
        The synthetic name of “Necessary Being in itself” is one of the most important names that Muslim philosophers, from Farabi to those of the present period, have used in their philosophical theology and, based on which, discussed the existence, attributes, and acts of God More
        The synthetic name of “Necessary Being in itself” is one of the most important names that Muslim philosophers, from Farabi to those of the present period, have used in their philosophical theology and, based on which, discussed the existence, attributes, and acts of God. In this paper, the writer has tried to analyze and explore the important points and ideas presented regarding this synthetic name through reviewing philosophical and kalami sources. The purpose here is twofold: to become familiar with some errors such as the “mixture of concept and referent” and the “mixture of the second philosophical intelligible with the first one”, which has occurred here, and to attain an accurate and defensible meaning of this name. In doing so, the writer initially demonstrates that two words of this synthetic name (being and necessary) are evident, polysemous, and secondary intelligibles and explains the importance of this point in the semantics of this name. Secondly, he analyzes and investigates the most important definitions provided for this name. From among the given six definitions, he criticizes the first and the fourth of them and pinpoints the sources of the errors committed in them. Later, while confirming the second, third, and fifth definitions, following Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Mulla Sadra, the writer chooses the definition of the Necessary Being in itself as a truth which is the same as existence as the best definition in a conceptual domain. Finally, he moves from the domain of “concept” to the domain of “existence” and provides an ontological interpretation of this name. Manuscript profile
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        4 - The Transcendent Philosophy and a Fortiori Logic
        Mahmud  Zeraatpishe
        On which logic is the Transcendent Philosophy based? In response to this important question, this paper refers to a fortiori logic. This logic not only reveals the effect of the graded levels of existence on the structure of propositions and judgments but also explains More
        On which logic is the Transcendent Philosophy based? In response to this important question, this paper refers to a fortiori logic. This logic not only reveals the effect of the graded levels of existence on the structure of propositions and judgments but also explains the propositions inferred from the comparison of existential and non-existential affairs. The important point here is that a fortiori logic can be traced in many of the Qur’anic verses. This paper presupposes that the historical development of Islamic philosophy, from the Peripatetic philosophy to the Transcendent Philosophy with the intention to justify religious statements, indicates the similarity between the logic inherent in its structure with the logic derived from religious texts. The truth of this assumption marks the obvious effect of Islam on the Transcendent Philosophy, through which we can properly justify the use of the attribute of “Islamic” for this philosophy. Manuscript profile
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        5 - Essential Possibility and Potential Possibility in Mulla Sadra and ‘Allamah Tabataba’i
        Mohammad Saeedimehr Seyyed Shahriyar  Kamali Sabziwari
        Mulla Sadra, initially, considers essential and potential possibilities to be homonyms but, finally, he accepts their polysemous relationship and maintains that both of them are of the type of secondary philosophical intelligibles, which exist through the existence of t More
        Mulla Sadra, initially, considers essential and potential possibilities to be homonyms but, finally, he accepts their polysemous relationship and maintains that both of them are of the type of secondary philosophical intelligibles, which exist through the existence of their origin. In the discussion of potency and act in al-Asfar, he goes even further and considers potential possibility to be of the type of the secondary philosophical intelligibles which are abstracted from existence in the other and external relation. However, his response to the question (the relation existing through non-being) is not convincing and raises some doubts. While accepting the existence of potential possibility through existence in the other and relation, and providing a correct explanation of the quality of this relation in the outside, ‘Allamah Tabataba’i gives an appropriate response to the above question. In this way he presents his innovative argument regarding moving from potency to act. Manuscript profile
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        6 - A Study of the Effect of Mulla Sadra’s View of the Soul on his View of Revelation
        Furugh al-Sadat  Rahimpoor Majid  Yaryan
        Mulla Sadra based his Transcendent Philosophy and psychology on some principles which, before him, had not received much attention as fundamental principles of a school of philosophy. The trans-substantial motion of the soul from matter to kingdom, gradation of existenc More
        Mulla Sadra based his Transcendent Philosophy and psychology on some principles which, before him, had not received much attention as fundamental principles of a school of philosophy. The trans-substantial motion of the soul from matter to kingdom, gradation of existence and the gradedness of the soul, the place of the world of imagination and the union of the soul with the Active Intellect are among these basic principles in Sadrian psychology. In this article, the writers explore the place of Mulla Sadra’s psychological principles in the knowledge of revelation and explanation of this process, as well as their impact on this field. From among the consequences of these principles we can refer to the kalami nature of revelation, its being impersonal and error-free, its being parallel with the intellect, and its continuity. Manuscript profile
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        7 - ذهن و مراتب واقع نمايي ادراك در انديشة صدرالدين قونوي
        Morteza  Jafarian Mohammad Javad  Rezaeirah
        The problem of the validity and limits of Man’s knowledge and perception and the relationship between the truth and essence of objects and their mental manifestations requires the clarification of the role of the mind in perception, their relationship with each other, a More
        The problem of the validity and limits of Man’s knowledge and perception and the relationship between the truth and essence of objects and their mental manifestations requires the clarification of the role of the mind in perception, their relationship with each other, and their relationship with the object. Although Sadr al-Din Qunawi has already explored the issues of knowledge and perception following an ontological approach, he has also paid particular attention to the role of the subject in the process of attaining knowledge while posing the problems of “knowledge” and its relationship with “existence” and its levels. His discussions in this regard include some innovative theories which cast some light on some of the ambiguous problems of the mind and knowledge and clarify the process of the emergence of epistemological philosophical thoughts in Islamic philosophy. In his view, Man’s acquired knowledge, which generally includes sense, imaginal, and intellectual perceptions, has two basic characteristics: On the one hand, knowledge is the manifestation of the object by itself and reveals some of the aspects, levels, and modes of its truth; on the other hand, it is continually consolidated within the mental frameworks and limits of the subject and is influenced by the active or passive role of the mind. In other words, knowledge is the product of the interaction between the subject and object. This theory, which was presented long before Kant’s well-known theory, has a different point of departure from that of Kant. However, in terms of its moving away from naive realism, which was the common theory of that time, it enjoys great importance. Qunawi also posed the problem of the cognation and coextensiveness of knowledge and perception with existence before Mulla Sadra and explained and analyzed many of its consequences and concomitants. Manuscript profile
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        8 - Transformation of the Problem of “the Universal and the Particular” in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy of Principiality of Existence
        Mohammad Hosseinzadeh
        One of the logical discussions which undergoes serious changes by accepting the principiality of existence is the problem of “the universal and the particular”. In the light of the principiality of existence and its ramifications, Mulla Sadra transformed the theory of a More
        One of the logical discussions which undergoes serious changes by accepting the principiality of existence is the problem of “the universal and the particular”. In the light of the principiality of existence and its ramifications, Mulla Sadra transformed the theory of all philosophers in this regard and reconstructed this problem in accordance to the principles of his own ontological philosophy. In his view, the criterion for universality is the intellectual existence, and the criterion for particularity is the particular, physical, and ideal existence. The known has to be abstracted from the particular, physical, and ideal existence in order to reach the level of universality. This abstraction is a truth different from the superficial abstract of other philosophers and can be called “promotional abstraction”. Mulla Sadra believes that the famous problem of the “gathering of universality and particularity” cannot be resolved based on the principles of other philosophers, whereas it is possible to do so on the basis of his philosophy. Moreover, he maintains that commonality means the ontological relation of an intellectual existent to individuals and not the potential presence of quiddity in them. Manuscript profile