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        1 - A Critical Study of Fayyad Lahiji’s View of the Gnostic Oneness of Being
        mahmoud saidi hadi hashemi
        One of the most important issues in theoretical gnosis which gnostics have tried to explain in the light of gnostic principles is the oneness of being. Nevertheless, the basic problem here is the demonstration of this gnostic theory. Fayyad Lahiji, one of the most promi Full Text
        One of the most important issues in theoretical gnosis which gnostics have tried to explain in the light of gnostic principles is the oneness of being. Nevertheless, the basic problem here is the demonstration of this gnostic theory. Fayyad Lahiji, one of the most prominent Shi‘ite mutikalimun and philosophers, initially advanced certain criticisms against the theory of the oneness of being based on the principles of the Peripatetic philosophy, then equated it with the graded oneness of being in the Transcendent Philosophy, and finally provided a philosophical kalami critique of Muhaqqiq Dawani’s theory in this regard. The present study indicates that Lahiji’s criticisms of the theory of the oneness of being were rooted in his ignorance of the related gnostic principles and the fact that the gradedness of being is different from the oneness of being in the view of gnostics. Hence, one cannot equate the oneness of being with the gradedness of being. Dawani’s theory also suffers from confusing the meanings of shared gnostic/philosophical and kalami terminology with each other. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        2 - A Study of Qaysari’s View of the Reality of Gnostic Time
        Hassan  Moradi mahmoud saidi
        Qaysari was one of the most prominent commentators of Ibn Arabi’s school. He also developed a specific theory about time based on gnostic principles. His view in this regard consists of some sections: a criticism of philosophical theories, particularly, those of Aristot Full Text
        Qaysari was one of the most prominent commentators of Ibn Arabi’s school. He also developed a specific theory about time based on gnostic principles. His view in this regard consists of some sections: a criticism of philosophical theories, particularly, those of Aristotle and Ibn Sina; gnostic interpretation of certain philosophical theories, and an explanation of the reality of time and its divisions based on gnostic principles. However, there are some problems with Qaysari’s objections to Ibn Sina’s view and his gnostic interpretations of some philosophical theories. The most important problem of his theory concerns his hadith-based proofs about the emergence of time through resorting to al-dahr (Perpetual Duration), which is one of God’s names. This is because the hadiths referred to by Qaysari are not valid enough and cannot be used to demonstrate his claim. Accordingly, it can be said that time emerges by resorting to God’s name of al-muqaddar (Determiner), and its emergence at different levels creates the divine day and night. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        3 - Ontological Analysis of the Problem of Weakness of Will in Transcendent Philosophy
        Akbar pour Marzieh Hassan  Moradi mahmoud saidi
        This paper focuses on the weakness of will or the distance between theory and practice. Thus it tries to explore the quality of the ontological analysis of this problem based on the theory of the graded unity of being. In a quiddative analysis, the principles of willful Full Text
        This paper focuses on the weakness of will or the distance between theory and practice. Thus it tries to explore the quality of the ontological analysis of this problem based on the theory of the graded unity of being. In a quiddative analysis, the principles of willful act enjoy causal and temporal sequence; however, in an ontological analysis, they are the levels of the single truth of being. Accordingly, knowledge and act are the different aspects of a single truth which, upon being originated in essence, is called knowledge at one stage and will or desire at another stage. As a result, knowledge and voluntary act are two ends of the same continuum which has a single root in human essence; a root of the type of love and bliss. In a quiddative approach, weakness of will is rooted in the weakness of the components of the causal chain preceding it, such as the concept of act and affirmation of its advantages. Nevertheless, in an ontological approach, the weakness of voluntary act is directly related to Man’s ontological weakness and the weakness of the knowledge which is commensurate with it. The ontological view differs from the quiddative view in that it does not consider voluntary act to be at the end of a chain of basic principles in separation from knowledge. Rather, it views act as one of the manifestations of an ontological truth which is commensurate with knowledge. Manuscript Document
      • Open Access Article

        4 - A Study of Ḥakīm Khājūī’s Objections to the Gnostic Theory of Oneness of Being
        Mahmud  Seydi Mohammad Javad  Pashaei
        As the basis of theoretical gnosis, oneness of being has provoked several debates among thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Mullā Ismā‘īl Khājūī, one of the thinkers and Mutikallimun of the Safavid period and post-Sadrian era, has criticized this theory and c Full Text
        As the basis of theoretical gnosis, oneness of being has provoked several debates among thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Mullā Ismā‘īl Khājūī, one of the thinkers and Mutikallimun of the Safavid period and post-Sadrian era, has criticized this theory and challenged it from different aspects. Khājūī rejects this theory based on the ontological differences between the Necessary Being and possible beings, absence of absoluteness in the Necessary Being, the lack of a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, and the inefficiency of the arguments of some gnostics and mystics on proving this oneness. However, the present study postulates that Khājūī’s criticisms originate in confusing the different meanings of certain key terms in philosophical sciences and kalām with those in theoretical gnosis. Nevertheless, it seems that in certain cases, such as gnostics’ failure in adducing a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, his criticism is justified. Manuscript Document