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        1 - Mulla Sadra’s Gnostic Explanation of the Theory of the Individual Unity of Existence
        Monireh  Sayyid Mazhari
        Mulla Sadra’s profound philosophical deliberations, which were accompanied by his intuitive contemplations, regarding the truth of being, finally led him to the theory of the individual unity of existence. In line with gnostics, he explicitly acknowledges the necessity More
        Mulla Sadra’s profound philosophical deliberations, which were accompanied by his intuitive contemplations, regarding the truth of being, finally led him to the theory of the individual unity of existence. In line with gnostics, he explicitly acknowledges the necessity of believing in this theory in some of his works, particularly, in his gnostic treatise of Iqaz al-na’imin. In order to provide a gnostic explanation for this theory in the realm of ontology, Mulla Sadra resorts to ontological terminology, describes the relationship between existence and quiddity, and discusses the validity of quiddities in terms of both their fact-itself individuation and ontological descent. In doing so, he initially propounds the theory of the graded unity of existence and states some delicate points in relation to its content. Then, based on the eternal and pre-eternal non-existential nature of possible things, he uses a gnostic language to clarify the individual unity of existence. Finally, he concludes that the unity or oneness of existents in their ontological essence is of an individual and permeating type rather than a specific one. In his view, true existence is exclusively limited to the existence of the Almighty, and all possible beings are the manifestations, appearances, and modes of the attributes of the existence of the Truth and enjoy a shadow-like existence in comparison to Him. Manuscript profile
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        2 - A Comparative Study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s and William Craig’s Views of Temporal Origination of the World
        Monireh  Sayyid Mazhari Alireza  Esmaeli
        One of the most profound ontological problems which has occupied the minds of thinkers and philosophers is the discussion of origination or eternity of the world. In Islamic tradition, through introducing the theory of trans-substantial motion, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to More
        One of the most profound ontological problems which has occupied the minds of thinkers and philosophers is the discussion of origination or eternity of the world. In Islamic tradition, through introducing the theory of trans-substantial motion, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to portray the renewing origination of the material world in such a way that, while enjoying consistency, it does not contradict any religious teachings. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, renewal is the same as existents’ being, and each renewal is an independent origination which ceaselessly occurs in the essence of existents in the course of time. The chain of events will never stop at a specific point due to the continuity of emanation; therefore, all components of the world are temporally originated. As a result, the world, as a mentally-posited whole, has no independent existence and is temporally originated as well. William Craig, the Christian thinker, has also based his cosmological argument on a new approach to the temporal origination of the world in the contemporary Western philosophical atmosphere. He maintains that the world and all its constituent parts, including time, have been created from nothing at a specific moment on divine free will and, since then, God, who existed prior to the creation of the world in an ethereal state, is now exposed to time because of His true relationship with temporal origination of things. The present study aims to reveal the efficiency of Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretation of the temporal origination of the world in comparison to Craig’s new approach. The findings of this comparison indicate that Craig’s attempts at presenting this new approach deserve due attention; however, comparing to Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, it not only lacks the necessary consistency but is also in clear contrast to some of the most fundamental religious theorems including the impossibility of attributing change to God’s essence, His eternity, His everlasting simultaneity with the created, and continuity of emanation. Manuscript profile
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        3 - Transcendence and Man’s Existential Width in the Ontological Systems of Mullā Ṣadrā and Heidegger
        Fatemeh  Ghadimi Paindeh Monireh  Sayyid Mazhari Zeinab Sadat Mirshamsi
        Heidegger has provided some innovative interpretations regarding several topics particularly in relation to human existence. His views about human beings are comparable to those of Mullā Ṣadrā in certain respects. One of them is their belief in man’s transcendence and e More
        Heidegger has provided some innovative interpretations regarding several topics particularly in relation to human existence. His views about human beings are comparable to those of Mullā Ṣadrā in certain respects. One of them is their belief in man’s transcendence and existential width. Both thinkers maintain that man is not an entity imprisoned in itself; man, who is the source of many possibilities and is aware of them, is subject to “becoming” and can become what they are not at the present time. In other words, man can go beyond the existing situation and attain transcendence. Although there is a similarity in this regard between the thoughts of these two thinkers, it should be considered that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological system, the human soul, owing to its essential immateriality, always enjoys a perception and understanding of its identity as connected to an unlimited being and infinite truth. The human soul, which entails the whole limits of being in itself, tries to grant meaning to its existence through gaining proximity and similarity to that infinite truth in the course of traversing its out-of-itself stages. The soul’s developmental journey for reaching the ultra-rational stage also continues after death. By contrast, in Heidegger’s ontological system, truth is based on Dasein, whose being real indicates that it is the only existence in the world. It also means that, without being connected to a mysterious and transcendent power, Dasein always possesses a pre-knowledge of everything that comprises the world and continually perceives things with no cover at highest levels of clarity. Therefore, Dasein relies on itself in transcendence, the continuation of which is motivated by actualizing its existential possibilities until it dies. Death is the last existential possibility of Dasein upon which it attains its end. Manuscript profile