Time

Open Access Article

1 - Time in the View of Islamic Philosophers and Theologians
Maqsud Mohammadi

One of the most important philosophical problems which has been discussed and explored in both physics and theology is time. A few theologians have considered time to be a non-existent entity and an illusion. However, those theologians and philosophers who view time as More

One of the most important philosophical problems which has been discussed and explored in both physics and theology is time. A few theologians have considered time to be a non-existent entity and an illusion. However, those theologians and philosophers who view time as an existential entity have presented various theories regarding the way of its existence and its truth. A group of theologians believe that time is an illusory thing, that is, it lacks an objective referent in the outside but has an origin of abstraction. Nevertheless, those who attribute an objective existence to time can be divided into two groups: some consider it to be an immaterial substance, and some others believe that it is a material and corporeal substance. However, the dominant theory holds that time enjoys an objective existence under the category of “quantity”; in other words, it is a “non-static continuous quantity” which is equal to the amount of motion in a sense, and the number of motion in another sense. Time measures the amount of motion over a specific distance. In fact, the relation of time to motion is similar to the relation of mathematical body to physical body. As a mathematical body grants determination to the ambiguous dimensions of a physical body, time also determines the amount of motion. Among all thinkers, Mulla Sadra treats this issue more meticulously and introduces time as the fourth dimension of material existents. This paper analyzes the various views of Muslim philosophers and theologians regarding time. Manuscript profile

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2 - Mulla Sadra’s View of Time in the Hereafter
Hadi Jafary Furugh al-Sadat Rahimpoor

The attention to the specific features of the Hereafter, such as time, and its comparison with worldly conditions can be witnessed in many of Mulla Sadra’s works. Given the presupposition that corporeal resurrection and the existence of other-worldly body are necessary More

The attention to the specific features of the Hereafter, such as time, and its comparison with worldly conditions can be witnessed in many of Mulla Sadra’s works. Given the presupposition that corporeal resurrection and the existence of other-worldly body are necessary in the Transcendent Philosophy, the question is whether time also exists in the Hereafter. If the answer is yes, what are its qualities and quantities, and how does it differ from worldly time? The present paper is intended to provide some responses to such questions about time and concludes that the existence of a kind of time which matches the Hereafter and the other-worldly corporeal existence is necessary for believing in corporeal resurrection. This kind of time enjoys a more perfect and intensive level of the worldly existence of time and possesses some other-worldly features such as the relativity of feeling the passage of time, influence of the extent and level of individual’s immateriality in the slowness or speed of the passage of time during other-worldly events, and correspondence of the perception of passage of time with the domination of angelic aspect over each individual (in the course of worldly life). Manuscript profile

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3 - An Analysis of the Relationship between Chimeric Time and Temporal Origination in the View of Mutikallimun
Alireza Kohansal M‘asoomeh Sadat Sary Arefi

The problem of the origination and eternity of the world has always been one of the most challenging topics of debate among Muslim philosophers and mutikallimun. This issue is closely related to different problems such as explaining the divine essence, attributes of kno More

The problem of the origination and eternity of the world has always been one of the most challenging topics of debate among Muslim philosophers and mutikallimun. This issue is closely related to different problems such as explaining the divine essence, attributes of knowledge, power and will, the relationship between attributes and essence, cause-effect necessity, the relationship between the perfect cause and effect, the criteria for the need of effect for a cause, determinant of the origination of the world, and the nature of time, place, etc. Early Muslim philosophers believed in the eternity of the world, which, in the view of Muslim mutikallimun, was inconsistent with religious verses and teachings. Given the literal meaning of Qur’anic verses and their own specific interpretation of the essence and attributes of knowledge and the divine power and free will, they brought faith in the temporal origination of the world. In order to justify this view, mutikallimun imagined a time at which the world did not exist but came into existence later. This time was named the “chimeric time”. The present study explores the relationship between the theory of chimeric time and temporal origination in the view of Muslim mutikallimun. Ultimately, it becomes clear that chimeric time is, firstly, based on the same general principles of the design of temporal origination. Secondly, it has been introduced in order to improve the idea of temporal origination in terms of structure and respond to philosophers’ related criticisms. At the same time, this theory is consistent with other aspects of kalami thoughts, such as the common view of the world, its relationship with God, and the lack of its demonstrative analysis. Generally speaking, in spite of the different and, at times, contradictory interpretations of this theory, it is yet a step forward in propounding the temporal origination of the world, which entails the idea of a time in conformity with various ontological worlds. Manuscript profile

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4 - A Study of Qaysari’s View of the Reality of Gnostic Time
Hassan Moradi mahmoud saidi

Qaysari was one of the most prominent commentators of Ibn Arabi’s school. He also developed a specific theory about time based on gnostic principles. His view in this regard consists of some sections: a criticism of philosophical theories, particularly, those of Aristot More

Qaysari was one of the most prominent commentators of Ibn Arabi’s school. He also developed a specific theory about time based on gnostic principles. His view in this regard consists of some sections: a criticism of philosophical theories, particularly, those of Aristotle and Ibn Sina; gnostic interpretation of certain philosophical theories, and an explanation of the reality of time and its divisions based on gnostic principles. However, there are some problems with Qaysari’s objections to Ibn Sina’s view and his gnostic interpretations of some philosophical theories. The most important problem of his theory concerns his hadith-based proofs about the emergence of time through resorting to al-dahr (Perpetual Duration), which is one of God’s names. This is because the hadiths referred to by Qaysari are not valid enough and cannot be used to demonstrate his claim. Accordingly, it can be said that time emerges by resorting to God’s name of al-muqaddar (Determiner), and its emergence at different levels creates the divine day and night. Manuscript profile

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5 - A Comparative Study of the Whatness of Time and the Temporal Origination of the World in Fakhr al-Din Razi and Mulla Sadra
Seyyed Mohammad Esmaeil Seyyed Hashemi Seyyed Mohammad Javad Seyyed Hashemi

One of the most important issues which should be addressed before examining the arguments on the originatedness or temporal pre-eternity of the world is what mutikallimun and philosophers mean by originatedness and temporal eternity. This question by itself is based on More

One of the most important issues which should be addressed before examining the arguments on the originatedness or temporal pre-eternity of the world is what mutikallimun and philosophers mean by originatedness and temporal eternity. This question by itself is based on another question as to what they mean by time. Owing to his mastery of kalami and philosophical views and following a critical approach, Fakhr al-Din Razi analyzes and compares the views of mutikallimun and philosophers about the originatedness and temporal pre-eternity of the world and their arguments in this regard and critically reviews the roots and the conceptual and assertoric principles of the two sides with respect to this issue. He believes that mutikallimun’s interpretation of time and temporal origination is absurd. Moreover, he rejects philosophers’ definition of time as to the amount of motion and a continuous quantity and, unlike the common belief, maintains that time is a disjunctive quantity. In contrast to other mutikallimun, he doubts the temporal originatedness of the world of intellects and immaterial entities. Nevertheless, by criticizing the ideas of early mutikallimun and philosophers, Mulla Sadra tries to bring the views of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek philosophers and followers of other religions in unison with his own ideas, while his interpretation of temporal origination and his fundamental philosophical principles are not consistent with such a unison. This is because the concept of Sadrian temporal originatedness is based on the principiality of existence and trans-substantial motion, which were discussed neither in Greek philosophy nor tackled by Islamic mutikallimun. This paper does not intend to evaluate the arguments on origination or pre-eternity; rather, it explores the whatness of origination or temporal pre-eternity in Mulla Sadra and Fakhr al-Din Razi. The authors believe that their shared objection to mutikallimun and Peripatetic philosophers concerns their interpretation of time and temporal origination. However, the difference between these two thinkers arises from their own conceptions of the whatness of time and temporal origination. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

6 - Circularity of the Definitions of Nature and Truth of Time in Ibn Sīnā’s View
Hamid Shahriari

20.1001.1.15600874.1401.27.4.4.0

Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khān More

Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khānsārī, believe that the circular nature of Ibn Sīnā’s definition of time in this book poses no problem because the concept of time is an axiom, and the existence of circularity in the definition of an axiom is natural. His other definition has been given in al-Shifā. Here, the nature of time is defined in the sense of a measure of motion as divided into prior and posterior components. In this definition, time contains disjunctive quantity (time as the number of motion) in addition to continuous quantity (time as amount of motion). The present paper aims to provide a clear picture of the definition of the nature of time in Ibn Sīnā’s view in his al-Ishārāt and al-Shifā in al-Ṭabi’iyyāt chapter. Following an analytic comparative study of Ibn Sīnā’s works, the author concludes that Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s perception of Ibn Sīnā’s definitions of the nature of time were not inconsistent and, rather, he intended to provide another analysis of the truth of time. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

7 - A Comparison of the Immateriality of Sensory and Imaginal Perceptions with the Growing Block View of Time
Mahdi Assadi

20.1001.1.15600874.1402.28.4.3.6

One of the important problems that has remained untouched in Sadrian philosophy is the growing block view of time. On the basis of the growing view of time is the non-existence of future, while the past and present have their fixed places. Muslim philosophers have not d More

One of the important problems that has remained untouched in Sadrian philosophy is the growing block view of time. On the basis of the growing view of time is the non-existence of future, while the past and present have their fixed places. Muslim philosophers have not directly addressed this idea; however, it seems to be necessary for demonstrating some statements of Sadrian philosophers about the immateriality of sensory and imaginal perceptions and memory. When we perceive something using our senses or imagination, the perception remains in our mind exactly in the same way that it had appeared. This paper is intended to illustrate that this view is, in fact, unrelated to immateriality and, in case of admissibility of its arguments, can only prove the growing block view of time. In line with this approach, the author has critically examined the literature on this theory in pre-Sadrian philosophers, particularly Suhrawardī’s claim as to attributing the idea of the growing block to some thinkers. Suhrawardī maintains that, as each of the motions has come into existence, so the whole of the motions have come into existence, and they are together in existence. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

8 - Mullā Ṣadrā and the Problem of Imaginary Time
Huda Habibimanesh shamsollah seraj Maijd Ziaei

20.1001.1.15600874.1402.29.1.2.2

One of the most controversial philosophical-kalami issues in the history of Islamic philosophy has always been the analysis of the problem of the origination and pre-eternity of the world. Most Muslim mutikallimūn believe in the temporal origination of the world and con More

One of the most controversial philosophical-kalami issues in the history of Islamic philosophy has always been the analysis of the problem of the origination and pre-eternity of the world. Most Muslim mutikallimūn believe in the temporal origination of the world and consider the pre-universe time to be “imaginary”. As the most supreme philosopher of the Transcendent Philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā has also discussed imaginary time in different places in his works. He has adopted two different approaches to this theory but does not express his view explicitly. The present study explains Mullā Ṣadrā’s opinions regarding the theory of imaginary time and his two approaches in this respect in order to answer the question of what his ultimate standpoint regarding imaginary time is. In order to accomplish this task, the authors have referred to the scattered discussions in his works and, after studying and explaining the relationships between them and combining them with each other, have provided a description of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ultimate view. Although in some places he tries to justify the theory of imaginary time based on his own principles, given his explicit statements on negating an intermediary between the world of being and Almighty Necessary as well as his demonstration of the existence of time and rejection of the arguments of deniers of time, it can be concluded that his ultimate view here is the negation of imaginary time. Manuscript profile

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