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        1 - A Critical Study of Hakim Sabziwari’s Innovative Arguments on the Trans-Substantial Motion
        Hussein Ali  Shidanshid Mohammad Hadi  Tavakkoli
        Among the various arguments that Hakim Sabziwari has adduced in his Sharh-i manzumah for demonstrating the theory of the trans-substantial motion, five appear to be among his own innovations at first glance. They include reasoning through the qualitative motion of ideas More
        Among the various arguments that Hakim Sabziwari has adduced in his Sharh-i manzumah for demonstrating the theory of the trans-substantial motion, five appear to be among his own innovations at first glance. They include reasoning through the qualitative motion of ideas in heavenly souls, reasoning through the renewal of Ideas, reasoning through the unified origination of the world, reasoning through the purposiveness of nature, and reasoning through the shadow-like unity of the soul. The present paper is aimed to report, analyze, and criticize such arguments. The conducted study indicates that four of these arguments can be considered to be among his innovations. The philosophical significance of these four-fold arguments mainly arise from the fact that they manifest the place of the theory of the trans-substantial motion, have mutual interactions with other problems in the field of the Transcendent-Philosophy, promote scrutiny regarding the different aspects and effects of this theory, and demonstrate the harmony and consistency among the various sections of Sadrian Transcendent Philosophy. However, the mentioned arguments are neither simple and explicit nor capable of proving this theory based on a few premises. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Circularity of the Definitions of Nature and Truth of Time in Ibn Sīnā’s View
        Hamid  Shahriari
        Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khān More
        Ibn Sīnā has provided two definitions for time, which Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī believes to be circular. The first definition has appeared in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt and introduces time as incompatible priority and posteriority. Some philosophers, such as Āqā Ḥussayn Khānsārī, believe that the circular nature of Ibn Sīnā’s definition of time in this book poses no problem because the concept of time is an axiom, and the existence of circularity in the definition of an axiom is natural. His other definition has been given in al-Shifā. Here, the nature of time is defined in the sense of a measure of motion as divided into prior and posterior components. In this definition, time contains disjunctive quantity (time as the number of motion) in addition to continuous quantity (time as amount of motion). The present paper aims to provide a clear picture of the definition of the nature of time in Ibn Sīnā’s view in his al-Ishārāt and al-Shifā in al-Ṭabi’iyyāt chapter. Following an analytic comparative study of Ibn Sīnā’s works, the author concludes that Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s perception of Ibn Sīnā’s definitions of the nature of time were not inconsistent and, rather, he intended to provide another analysis of the truth of time. Manuscript profile
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        3 - Mullā Ṣadrā’s Strategies for Reducing Death Anxiety and its Philosophical Principles
        Manouchehr Shaminezhad Hossein Atrak Mohsen Jahed
        The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s strategies for treating death anxiety and its philosophical foundations. It also aims to suggest some philosophical and ontological strategies to decrease modern Man’s anxiety when thinking about death based on some of Mullā More
        The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s strategies for treating death anxiety and its philosophical foundations. It also aims to suggest some philosophical and ontological strategies to decrease modern Man’s anxiety when thinking about death based on some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles, such as the principiality of existence, the union of the intellect with intelligible, the trans-substantial motion, theism, religiosity, and believing in the Hereafter. According to Sadrian philosophy, Man’s life is meaningful and purposeful, and being has been created based on divine emanation. The human soul is corporeally-originated; however, its essence changes because of its union with the intelligible and its own trans-substantial motion and attains higher levels of being though going through different existential grades. This developmental move continues until reaching the origin of being and does not end with death. It also grants meaning to Man’s life and decreases their death anxiety. Mullā Ṣadrā is an existential philosopher who advocates a supernaturalist, theistic, and procedural approach to death. The reality of death in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is a part of Man’s process of existential development. Some of the strategies that can be inferred from his philosophy to reduce death anxiety include following a teleological approach to the world, being’s view of God as pure connection, believing in the Hereafter and Man’s resurrection after corporeal death, advocating ontological evolution, and having a developmental view of death. Manuscript profile
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        4 - Mullā Ṣadrā and the Problem of Imaginary Time
        Huda Habibimanesh shamsollah seraj Maijd  Ziaei
        One of the most controversial philosophical-kalami issues in the history of Islamic philosophy has always been the analysis of the problem of the origination and pre-eternity of the world. Most Muslim mutikallimūn believe in the temporal origination of the world and con More
        One of the most controversial philosophical-kalami issues in the history of Islamic philosophy has always been the analysis of the problem of the origination and pre-eternity of the world. Most Muslim mutikallimūn believe in the temporal origination of the world and consider the pre-universe time to be “imaginary”. As the most supreme philosopher of the Transcendent Philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā has also discussed imaginary time in different places in his works. He has adopted two different approaches to this theory but does not express his view explicitly. The present study explains Mullā Ṣadrā’s opinions regarding the theory of imaginary time and his two approaches in this respect in order to answer the question of what his ultimate standpoint regarding imaginary time is. In order to accomplish this task, the authors have referred to the scattered discussions in his works and, after studying and explaining the relationships between them and combining them with each other, have provided a description of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ultimate view. Although in some places he tries to justify the theory of imaginary time based on his own principles, given his explicit statements on negating an intermediary between the world of being and Almighty Necessary as well as his demonstration of the existence of time and rejection of the arguments of deniers of time, it can be concluded that his ultimate view here is the negation of imaginary time. Manuscript profile
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        5 - Transcendence and Man’s Existential Width in the Ontological Systems of Mullā Ṣadrā and Heidegger
        Fatemeh  Ghadimi Paindeh Monireh  Sayyid Mazhari Zeinab Sadat Mirshamsi
        Heidegger has provided some innovative interpretations regarding several topics particularly in relation to human existence. His views about human beings are comparable to those of Mullā Ṣadrā in certain respects. One of them is their belief in man’s transcendence and e More
        Heidegger has provided some innovative interpretations regarding several topics particularly in relation to human existence. His views about human beings are comparable to those of Mullā Ṣadrā in certain respects. One of them is their belief in man’s transcendence and existential width. Both thinkers maintain that man is not an entity imprisoned in itself; man, who is the source of many possibilities and is aware of them, is subject to “becoming” and can become what they are not at the present time. In other words, man can go beyond the existing situation and attain transcendence. Although there is a similarity in this regard between the thoughts of these two thinkers, it should be considered that in Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological system, the human soul, owing to its essential immateriality, always enjoys a perception and understanding of its identity as connected to an unlimited being and infinite truth. The human soul, which entails the whole limits of being in itself, tries to grant meaning to its existence through gaining proximity and similarity to that infinite truth in the course of traversing its out-of-itself stages. The soul’s developmental journey for reaching the ultra-rational stage also continues after death. By contrast, in Heidegger’s ontological system, truth is based on Dasein, whose being real indicates that it is the only existence in the world. It also means that, without being connected to a mysterious and transcendent power, Dasein always possesses a pre-knowledge of everything that comprises the world and continually perceives things with no cover at highest levels of clarity. Therefore, Dasein relies on itself in transcendence, the continuation of which is motivated by actualizing its existential possibilities until it dies. Death is the last existential possibility of Dasein upon which it attains its end. Manuscript profile