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        1 - An Analytic-Comparative Study of the Theory of “Necessity of Fixed Affirmation” in Sayyid Sanad and Mullā Ṣadrā
        Fatemeh Abedini Ali  Arshad Riahi
        Regarding the “principle of presupposition”, which is one of the important principles in the realm of philosophy, philosophers are unanimous in support of the “necessity of positive affirmation; however, there are some disagreements among them in relation to the “necess More
        Regarding the “principle of presupposition”, which is one of the important principles in the realm of philosophy, philosophers are unanimous in support of the “necessity of positive affirmation; however, there are some disagreements among them in relation to the “necessity of fixed affirmation”. Two theories have been presented on fixed affirmation: many well-known philosophers maintain that fixed affirmation is not necessary, while some others believe in the opposite. Mullā Ṣadrā is one of the followers of the latter position. He has quoted the theory of the lack of the necessity of fixed affirmation from one of its believers without providing the source. Some of the commentators of his works have attributed it to Sayyid Sanad in addition to Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī and ‘Allāmah Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī. Nevertheless, the quoted theory does not correspond to what is found in Sayyid Sanad’s manuscripts and, conversely, he appears to believe in the “necessity of fixed affirmation”. The argument of the lack of necessity of fixed affirmation belongs to his contemporary thinker, ‘Allāmah Dawānī. Finally, the authors conclude that, while benefitting from Sayyid Sanad’s theory, Mullā Ṣadrā has provided a specific theory which is different from his. Manuscript profile
      • Open Access Article

        2 - An Analytic-Comparative Study of the Theory of the Simplicity of Derivation in Sayyid Sanad and Mulla Sadra
        Fatemeh Abedini Ali  Arshad Riahi Mahmud  Zeraatpishe
        In some disciplines such as logic, usul al-fiqh, and philosophy, there are two main theories regarding the derivative and the truth of its component parts: conceptual superimposition of the derivative and its simplicity. Each of these two theories provides a different i More
        In some disciplines such as logic, usul al-fiqh, and philosophy, there are two main theories regarding the derivative and the truth of its component parts: conceptual superimposition of the derivative and its simplicity. Each of these two theories provides a different interpretation of philosophical problems. Hence, similar to other thinkers in the field of religious sciences, philosophers have exercised extreme care in choosing one of these stances. Among the related approaches, Sayyid Sanad has provided a different view and believes in the limitedness of the derivative. He maintains that this concept potentially (not actually) consists of three components. A study of Mulla Sadra’s views indicates that the theory which has been rejected in the name of Sayyid Sanad in Mulla Sadra’s works is not compatible with what we find in the words of Sayyid Sanad himself. Mulla Sadra is mainly interested in the view of Sayyid Sanad’s rival, that is, Muhaqqiq Dawani. Manuscript profile
      • Open Access Article

        3 - A Critical Study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Attributing the Madeness of the Concept of Existent to Sayyid Sanad
        Fatemeh Abedini Ali  Arshad Riahi
        The Problem of making is the topic of some philosophical discussions, and there are three famous views regarding its object. Some thinkers, such as Shaykh Ishrāq and his followers, including ‘Allāmah Dawānī, believe that quiddity is made; some others believe in the made More
        The Problem of making is the topic of some philosophical discussions, and there are three famous views regarding its object. Some thinkers, such as Shaykh Ishrāq and his followers, including ‘Allāmah Dawānī, believe that quiddity is made; some others believe in the madeness of attribution, while another group consider existence to be made, Mullā Ṣadrā rejects the madeness of quiddity and attribution but accepts the madeness of existence. Nevertheless, prior to Mullā Ṣadrā, Sayyid Sanad maintained that it is the “concept of existent” which is made. Mullā Ṣadrā holds that Sayyid Sanad’s intention of the “concept of existent” in the problem of making is concept qua concept rather than a real thing. Therefore, he quotes Sayyid Sanad’s view alongside the three main views regarding the made (as a separate idea) and considers it to be close to his own view. In the same vein, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators assert that Sayyid Sanad’s intention of the “concept of existent” was concept qua concept. However, a study of Sayyid Sanad’s original works (manuscripts) reveals that this attribution is not consistent with reality and, by the “concept of existent” in the problem of madeness, Sayyid Sanad meant the same true existence and not concept qua concept. Thus Sayyid Sanad and Mullā Ṣadrā hold the same view in this regard. Manuscript profile