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        1 - Principiality of Existence and Change in the Logic of Definition
        Musa  Malayeri
        One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divide More
        One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divided into term and description. After Aristotle, the logic of definition was accepted by philosophers and logicians in its same primary form for a long period. Muslim Peripatetics followed almost the same trend until, in the course of the development of philosophy in the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra established the School of the Transcendent Philosophy through explaining and demonstrating the principiality of existence as well as developing some other ontological principles. One of the specific features of the Transcendent Philosophy was to harshly challenge the ontological bases of the logic of definition. Based on the theory of the principiality of existence, quiddities which, according to early philosophers, represent the objective reality of things, are reduced to mental concepts, and existence, which is the objective reality of things, cannot be perceived unless through direct observation. On the other hand, in this system, differentia, which is the basis of each quiddity and is considered to be the whole truth and actuality of each object, is not a quiddative thing and cannot be known through quiddative concepts. In this way, the basis of the five universals as the underlying foundation of the logic of definition became unstable. Following such changes, we expect to witness a fundamental review of Aristotelian logic and, particularly, of the concept of definition therein. The outcome of this overall change would be nothing but attaching more importance to the conceptual definition of truths, which is one of the significant consequences of the theory of the principiality of existence. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Existence, Annexation, and Derivation: A Study of Mir Damad’s Theory on Being Existent and Derivation
        Davood  Hosseini
        In his books of al-Qabasat and al-Ufuq al-mobin, Mir Damad has presented two arguments against the annexed nature of existence. In this paper, the writer deals with two questions regarding these arguments. The first is whether Mir Damad’s arguments have a historical bac More
        In his books of al-Qabasat and al-Ufuq al-mobin, Mir Damad has presented two arguments against the annexed nature of existence. In this paper, the writer deals with two questions regarding these arguments. The first is whether Mir Damad’s arguments have a historical background, and the second is whether their consequences support his theory on the derivation of “existent”. Here, the first question is answered briefly by presenting two of the most famous arguments of philosophers and mutikallimun (particularly, Suhrawardi’s famous argument and that of the commentator of Maqasid). Next, the writer provides some reasons indicating that not only are Mir Damad’s arguments different from them but they are also logically and polemically superior to them. Nevertheless, a complete response is given to the second question by arguing that if we take one of Mir Damad’s theories of existence (non-precedence of existence to the object) for granted, the non-annexed nature of existence would result in the non-derivation of the “existent”. Manuscript profile
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        3 - Range of the Interpretations of Quiddative Concepts Based on the Principiality of Existence in the View of Contemporary Commentators of Sadrian Wisdom
        Rohollah Adineh Roghayeh Mosavi
        The principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity are the main bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and his particular theories. On the other hand, he has not provided a clear and accurate picture of these two theories in his philosophical system and has More
        The principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity are the main bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and his particular theories. On the other hand, he has not provided a clear and accurate picture of these two theories in his philosophical system and has referred to quiddity using different terms. Each of the contemporary commentators of the Transcendent Philosophy have interpreted quiddity and existence in a way based on their own views and theoretical principles and have tried to predicate it on Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory. However, given the fundamental role of quiddity and quiddative concepts in gaining acquired knowledge, disagreement in the interpretation of quiddity will affect the quality of explaining acquired knowledge. Hence, following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study aims to provide a correct interpretation for quiddity from the viewpoint of contemporary commentators of Sadrian philosophy and, then, investigate whether our acquired knowledge of existents, which is attained through quiddative concepts, is positive or negative. Accordingly, the authors have examined and criticized such commentators’ interpretations of quiddity and the way it explains existence. A short answer here is that, apparently, based on the correct view, which belongs to Professor Javadi Amuli, quiddity is the manifestation of determined existence, and quiddative concepts speak of limited existence, which is clearly a positive rather than a negative and purifying statement. Manuscript profile
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        4 - A Review of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Responses to the Problem of the Necessity of Subsuming One Quiddity into two Categories in the Discussion of Mental Existence
        Mohammad Hadi  Tavakkoli
        Based on the theory of the qualitative nature of knowledge and the identity of mental and objective quiddities, the acceptance of the theory of mental existence poses the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā More
        Based on the theory of the qualitative nature of knowledge and the identity of mental and objective quiddities, the acceptance of the theory of mental existence poses the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to solve this problem through distinguishing between common and primary predications, application of two categories to knowledge from two essential and accidental aspects, negation of the subsistence of inherence, and acceptance of the application of two categories to cognitive form due to the mentally-positedness of quiddity, and the possibility of its shadow-like realization in the form of multiple existences. Although a study of his responses indicate their incompleteness in resolving the issue, his principles have paved the ground for accomplishing this task through accepting the “predication of the indicator on the indicated”. According to this view, regardless of what the nature and category of the cognitive form is, the narration of the nature of an external thing is introduced as the ontological attribute of the cognitive form, which has nothing to do with its nature and is, rather, outside the realm of categories. Through this solution, we can both maintain the correspondence between the cognitive form and the nature of the external thing and, while accepting the realization of the cognitive form in the mind, resolve the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. Manuscript profile