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        1 - Principiality of Existence and Change in the Logic of Definition
        Musa  Malayeri
        One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divide More
        One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divided into term and description. After Aristotle, the logic of definition was accepted by philosophers and logicians in its same primary form for a long period. Muslim Peripatetics followed almost the same trend until, in the course of the development of philosophy in the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra established the School of the Transcendent Philosophy through explaining and demonstrating the principiality of existence as well as developing some other ontological principles. One of the specific features of the Transcendent Philosophy was to harshly challenge the ontological bases of the logic of definition. Based on the theory of the principiality of existence, quiddities which, according to early philosophers, represent the objective reality of things, are reduced to mental concepts, and existence, which is the objective reality of things, cannot be perceived unless through direct observation. On the other hand, in this system, differentia, which is the basis of each quiddity and is considered to be the whole truth and actuality of each object, is not a quiddative thing and cannot be known through quiddative concepts. In this way, the basis of the five universals as the underlying foundation of the logic of definition became unstable. Following such changes, we expect to witness a fundamental review of Aristotelian logic and, particularly, of the concept of definition therein. The outcome of this overall change would be nothing but attaching more importance to the conceptual definition of truths, which is one of the significant consequences of the theory of the principiality of existence. Manuscript profile
      • Open Access Article

        2 - Origin of Fundamental Conflicts Concerning the Final Cause
        Yaser  Taherrahimi Musa  Malayeri
        The supreme place of the issue of the final cause is no secret to the people of thought. This topic is so important that some great figures, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have considered it as the most important component of wisdom. At the same time, there are some More
        The supreme place of the issue of the final cause is no secret to the people of thought. This topic is so important that some great figures, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have considered it as the most important component of wisdom. At the same time, there are some salient differences in this regard among its advocates and opponents. In Islamic philosophy, the problem of final cause has been mainly tackled by responding to the advanced criticisms while, in contemporary Western philosophy, the discussion of this topic is considered to be unimportant and superfluous. Rarely ever have either Islamic or Aristotelian philosophers dealt with the fundamental reasons and roots of the confirmation or rejection of the final cause; however, no consensus will be arrived at regarding superstructures without first analyzing the basic ideas. Here, through an analytic study of the conceptual and assertoric bases of the final cause, the authors have tried to investigate and evaluate the main roots of the conflicts over this problem in order to facilitate the judgment of superstructures. In doing so, they have focused on such concepts as the relationship between efficient and final causes, origin of motion, potency and predisposition, and essentialism and archetype. Manuscript profile
      • Open Access Article

        3 - Interpretation of two Arguments of the Theory of Motion in Immaterial Things
        Seyed Hosain  Hosaini Musa  Malayeri
        Most Muslim philosophers – including the Peripatetics, Illuminationists, and Sadrians – have rejected the possibility of change and motion in immaterial things based on their own principles. However, during the last two decades, some authorities in the field of philosop More
        Most Muslim philosophers – including the Peripatetics, Illuminationists, and Sadrians – have rejected the possibility of change and motion in immaterial things based on their own principles. However, during the last two decades, some authorities in the field of philosophy have opposed this idea and argued for the possibility of motion and change in immaterial thing. This theory has attracted the attention of a number of academic centers, and some papers and books have been written on this subject. The proponents of this view have provided some arguments in its favor, and its opponents have rejected them. Following an analytic approach, this paper defends the theory of the existence of motion in immaterial things at two stages. Initially, the authors provide a response to the criticism targeting the main argument of this theory and defend its legitimacy; secondly, through resorting to the createdness of the soul, they present a new argument in its favor. Finally, they conclude that the mentioned theory is acceptable in the realm of rationality and reasoning and is superior to its counter-theory. Manuscript profile