اراده

List of Articles اراده

Open Access Article
- Abstract Page
- Full-Text
1 - Ontological Analysis of the Problem of Weakness of Will in Transcendent Philosophy
Akbar pour Marzieh Hassan Moradi mahmoud saidi

This paper focuses on the weakness of will or the distance between theory and practice. Thus it tries to explore the quality of the ontological analysis of this problem based on the theory of the graded unity of being. In a quiddative analysis, the principles of willful More

This paper focuses on the weakness of will or the distance between theory and practice. Thus it tries to explore the quality of the ontological analysis of this problem based on the theory of the graded unity of being. In a quiddative analysis, the principles of willful act enjoy causal and temporal sequence; however, in an ontological analysis, they are the levels of the single truth of being. Accordingly, knowledge and act are the different aspects of a single truth which, upon being originated in essence, is called knowledge at one stage and will or desire at another stage. As a result, knowledge and voluntary act are two ends of the same continuum which has a single root in human essence; a root of the type of love and bliss. In a quiddative approach, weakness of will is rooted in the weakness of the components of the causal chain preceding it, such as the concept of act and affirmation of its advantages. Nevertheless, in an ontological approach, the weakness of voluntary act is directly related to Man’s ontological weakness and the weakness of the knowledge which is commensurate with it. The ontological view differs from the quiddative view in that it does not consider voluntary act to be at the end of a chain of basic principles in separation from knowledge. Rather, it views act as one of the manifestations of an ontological truth which is commensurate with knowledge. Manuscript profile
Open Access Article
- Abstract Page
- Full-Text
2 - The Reasons Behind Lack of Moral Commitment in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View:Weakness of Belief, Desire, and Will Power
Mehdi Zamani
20.1001.1.15600874.1401.27.4.3.9

In the view of the Transcendent Philosophy, knowledge, love, kindness, desire, and free will, similar to existence, exist at various levels in all existents, including in Man’s voluntary acts. Lack of moral commitment results from one of the following three factors: 1) More

In the view of the Transcendent Philosophy, knowledge, love, kindness, desire, and free will, similar to existence, exist at various levels in all existents, including in Man’s voluntary acts. Lack of moral commitment results from one of the following three factors: 1) weakness of moral beliefs (lack of perfect certainty and being heedless of existing beliefs); 2) weakness of desire (dominance of whimsical desires and forces and wrath over rational and moral enthusiasm), and 3) weakness of will power (weakness in making decisions and removing obstacles to the desired aim). Accordingly, moral commitment is realized through: 1) attaining the level of certainly and notifying others; 2) intensifying enthusiasm to the level of intellectual desire and delight, and 3) strengthening will power to make the right decision. Given the graded structure of the principles of voluntary act and the promotion and strengthening of the three levels of belief, desire, and will can consolidate the relationship among them and the realization of act will bring them closer to necessity. Manuscript profile
Open Access Article
- Abstract Page
- Full-Text
3 - A Critical Study of the Definition of Practice in Mullā Ṣadrā
Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi Keramat Varzdar
20.1001.1.15600874.1402.29.2.3.5

Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the distinction of practice from other acts pertains to its “intentional” nature. In his view, “intention” includes the free will accompanied with the second level of consciousness acting based on the purpose of practice. Therefore, not each v More

Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the distinction of practice from other acts pertains to its “intentional” nature. In his view, “intention” includes the free will accompanied with the second level of consciousness acting based on the purpose of practice. Therefore, not each voluntary act is called “practice”; rather, practice is a voluntary act that emerges along with the second level consciousness based on the purpose of act. The results of this study, which was conducted following a descriptive-analytic method and through the analysis of conceptual concomitants of practice, indicate that Mullā Ṣadrā’s definition is not mutually exclusive. This is because, based on the example of “self-conscious” robot, one can assume an agent that enjoys free will and consciousness but its act is not intentional. Therefore, to complete the definition of practice, in addition to free will and consciousness, one needs a third element or the same “choice”. Mullā Ṣadrā does not officially recognize “choice” as the third element of practice and reduces it to the same consciousness and the free will. Nevertheless, the present study demonstrates that he is wrong, and “choice” in the sense of “the freedom to use the free will” must be added to the definition of practice. This study mainly aims to examine the quiddative structure of “practice” in the Transcendent Philosophy and distinguish “practice” from other similar affairs. Manuscript profile

Current Issue

Published Issues

Menu

Browse

List of Articles اراده