Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the distinction of practice from other acts pertains to its “intentional” nature. In his view, “intention” includes the free will accompanied with the second level of consciousness acting based on the purpose of practice. Therefore, not each v
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Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the distinction of practice from other acts pertains to its “intentional” nature. In his view, “intention” includes the free will accompanied with the second level of consciousness acting based on the purpose of practice. Therefore, not each voluntary act is called “practice”; rather, practice is a voluntary act that emerges along with the second level consciousness based on the purpose of act. The results of this study, which was conducted following a descriptive-analytic method and through the analysis of conceptual concomitants of practice, indicate that Mullā Ṣadrā’s definition is not mutually exclusive. This is because, based on the example of “self-conscious” robot, one can assume an agent that enjoys free will and consciousness but its act is not intentional. Therefore, to complete the definition of practice, in addition to free will and consciousness, one needs a third element or the same “choice”. Mullā Ṣadrā does not officially recognize “choice” as the third element of practice and reduces it to the same consciousness and the free will. Nevertheless, the present study demonstrates that he is wrong, and “choice” in the sense of “the freedom to use the free will” must be added to the definition of practice. This study mainly aims to examine the quiddative structure of “practice” in the Transcendent Philosophy and distinguish “practice” from other similar affairs.
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