Despite the existence of different and, at times, contradictory views regarding ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s theory of mentally-posited things, almost all the studies carried out in this field unanimously presuppose that this theory is essentially of an epistemological nature More
Despite the existence of different and, at times, contradictory views regarding ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s theory of mentally-posited things, almost all the studies carried out in this field unanimously presuppose that this theory is essentially of an epistemological nature and is intended to justify a series of human perceptions that have no equal in the outside. Although this presupposition is not wrong, it fails to explain all the realities regarding the theory of mentally-posited things. Here, the authors try to demonstrate that this theory is basically of an ontological rather than epistemological nature. Given the quality of propounding this theory in al-Wilāyah and al-Insān treatises, it appears that consideration is one of the specific features of the being of an immaterial Man who lives in the physical world. This is a feature that makes some human acts which are in a way related to material affairs possible.
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