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Open Access Article

1 - Corporeality of other than God in Islamic Kalam
Mehdi Qajavand

Islamic kalam is the fruit of the efforts of early mutikallimun in the history of Islam. From among the main teachings of Islamic kalam, the immateriality of God, on the one hand, and corporeality of what is other than Him, on the other, enjoy particular importance. The More

Islamic kalam is the fruit of the efforts of early mutikallimun in the history of Islam. From among the main teachings of Islamic kalam, the immateriality of God, on the one hand, and corporeality of what is other than Him, on the other, enjoy particular importance. They are in fact two of the few issues that are almost shared by all kalami schools, especially those in early Hijri centuries. The Mu‘tazilite, Shi‘ite, Ash‘arite, and other kalami schools of thought all agree with the immateriality of God and corporeality of other than Him. This unanimity is rooted in their religiosity since they believe that attributing “immateriality” to other than God may undermine the foundations of God’s Oneness and weaken the pillars of theology. Accordingly, mutikallimun introduce what is other than God as corporeal things (whether subtle or dense) and consider the “immaterial” to be a perfect truth and an absolute needless being. This theory is the basis of some major kalami teachings. The negation of anthropomorphism and immaterial worlds (such as the world of intellects) is among the negative aspects of this view, while the corporeality of angels, createdness of the world, annihilation of the world, and corporeal resurrection are among its affirmative aspects. Manuscript profile

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2 - Creativity of the Soul and its Anthropological Principles in the Transcendent Philosophy
Fatemeh Estesnaei Seyyed Morteza Hosseini Shahroudi Jahangir Masoudi

In Mulla Sadra’s view the rational soul has been created in such a way that, immediately after having the knowledge and the will, it can actualize its intention as one of its own modes. However, this ability is of different stronger and weaker grades at different ontolo More

In Mulla Sadra’s view the rational soul has been created in such a way that, immediately after having the knowledge and the will, it can actualize its intention as one of its own modes. However, this ability is of different stronger and weaker grades at different ontological configurations and levels of the souls. In the Transcendent Philosophy, the domain of the soul’s creativity is divided into two inner and outer fields. The inner field refers to the hidden worlds of the soul and the outer field contains nature and metaphysics. A clear example of inner creativity is the making of mental forms, and one example of external creativity is the miracles done by prophets and favorites of God. Some of the anthropological principles of creativity in the Transcendent Philosophy which are examined extensively in this paper include the immateriality of the soul, the immateriality of the imaginal faculty, being a knowing agent, simplicity of the soul, and the soul’s being a supreme paradigm. Accordingly, the human soul, as a divine existent who is the vicegerent and perfect manifestation of God Almighty, in addition to its internal creativity can be everything which is rationally manifested to its mind under its control and grant external existence to mental existents provided that it becomes identical with perfect immaterial things in terms of knowledge and act. Manuscript profile

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3 - Shared Model of the Body-Centered Arguments of the Immateriality of the Soul in Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra
Majid Yaryan Furugh al-Sadat Rahimpoor Mehdi Emam Jome

Some Islamic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have dealt with the characteristics of the soul, including the demonstration of its immateriality, in their anthropological discussions. A study of the works of these two philosophers indicates that the positi More

Some Islamic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have dealt with the characteristics of the soul, including the demonstration of its immateriality, in their anthropological discussions. A study of the works of these two philosophers indicates that the positive arguments of the immateriality of the soul are all based on the negation of the characteristics of the body and bodily matter. In other words, they denote that the soul lacks bodily features and, hence, demonstrates that it is immaterial. For example, bodily matter enjoys quantity, position, change, divisibility, and finitude of acts; it is vulnerable to weakness, aging, and tiredness. Moreover, the knowledge of the body and its acts is of the acquired type and is conditioned by place and position. These two philosophers demonstrate the immateriality of the soul by negating and denying the above characteristics to it. Thus the knowledge of the soul and demonstration of its immaterial nature would be impossible without the knowledge of the body and disallowing any bodily features for it. In this paper, in addition to revising the arguments of the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul and determining the key place of the body therein, it has been tried to design and provide a general model entailing all such arguments. Manuscript profile

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4 - A Comparative Study of Ibn Sina’s and Mulla Sadra’s Philosophical Principles of Intermediary Development Based on Religious Texts
Seyyed Sadra al-Din Taheri امينه احمدي

In religious sources, based on the logic of revelation, the development of the soul in the intermediate world is certain and impeccable. However, the quality of intermediary development and its probable inconsistency certain philosophical principles, such as the necessi More

In religious sources, based on the logic of revelation, the development of the soul in the intermediate world is certain and impeccable. However, the quality of intermediary development and its probable inconsistency certain philosophical principles, such as the necessity for any kind of development to be preceded by potency and motion and allocating them to matter, makes it necessary for this kind of development to be only possible based on religious (Shar‘i) principles. In other words, philosophers might not be able to demonstrate the possibility of the souls’ intermediary development on the basis of rational principles. In this paper, the writers initially examine the traditional proofs for intermediary development based on religious texts and then investigate it in the light of the fundamental principles proposed by two prominent Islamic philosophers, Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra. After a comparative study of their views, the writers conclude that intermediary development is impossible based on both philosophers’ principles regarding motion. However, they also argue that, given Mulla Sadra’s view of the Ideal immateriality of the soul and his belief in the Ideal Otherworldly body, there is a more appropriate, but not sufficient, context for the posthumous development of the body. Manuscript profile

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5 - A Critical Analysis of Abdulrazzaq Lahiji’s View of the World of Suspended Ideas
Zakaria Baharnezhad

Believing or not believing in the world of suspended Ideas is one of the philosophical problems which affects philosophers’ approaches and methods in conducting their studies. Hence, it is necessary to examine this problem more profoundly following a new approach and be More

Believing or not believing in the world of suspended Ideas is one of the philosophical problems which affects philosophers’ approaches and methods in conducting their studies. Hence, it is necessary to examine this problem more profoundly following a new approach and benefitting from original and authentic sources. In the same vein, the present paper is intended to, firstly, present a clear picture of the “world of suspended Ideas” and its difference from “Platonic Ideas” in Suhrawardi’s view. Next, the author explains Hakim Abdulrazzaq Lahiji’s view of Suhrawardi’s world of suspended Ideas and presents his critique in this regard. Finally, he tries to respond to Lahiji’s criticisms. The author does not believe that he has covered all the details with respect to the theme of this paper; however, he can claim that no reliable research or critical study has ever been conducted on Hakim Lahiji’s view of the theory of suspended Ideas. Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, the theologian philosopher, provided some responses to Lahiji’s criticisms in his book of Asrar al-hikam; nevertheless, his responses are not conclusive, and they are very difficult to understand. It is hoped that this study opens the way for a new series of research activities in this regard. The author also hopes that future studies on the world of suspended Ideas will not suffer from the potential deficits of this study. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

6 - ‌ A Comparative Study of the Views of Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Aristotle of the Substantiality of the Soul and its Immateriality and Immortality
Qasim Pourhassan Hosein Gholizadeh

Aristotle believes that the soul is necessarily a substance and views substance as the main ontological concept of his philosophy. Accordingly, it is important to learn about his idea of substance in order to perceive his view of the materiality or immateriality of the More

Aristotle believes that the soul is necessarily a substance and views substance as the main ontological concept of his philosophy. Accordingly, it is important to learn about his idea of substance in order to perceive his view of the materiality or immateriality of the soul. Aristotle received great attention in the tradition of Islamic philosophy, particularly, the Peripatetic philosophy, and the stance of Islamic thinkers with regard to the soul bears some direct or close relationship with his theories. Farabi and Ibn Sina agree with Aristotle’s different definitions of substance and its general division into sensible and insensible types. However, the fundamental differences between their ideas and those of this Greek philosopher have yielded certain consequences which are quite noteworthy. The main purpose of this study is to explore such differences and discover their ultimate views on the immateriality and immortality of the soul. Accordingly, the writers initially examine the words that Aristotle used in order to define the meaning of substance and, secondly, refer to the various works in which he discussed the concept of substance. Finally, they compare his ideas in this regard with those of Farabi and Ibn Sina. Manuscript profile

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7 - A Critical Study of Functionalism with a Glance at Mulla Sadra’s Self-Knowledge
Reza Safari Kandsari

The relationship between the body and the soul is one of the complex issues in philosophy. The Cartesian and Platonic dualism is one of the solutions offered for this problem. Descartes and Plato believed that the soul and body are two different substances and enjoy the More

The relationship between the body and the soul is one of the complex issues in philosophy. The Cartesian and Platonic dualism is one of the solutions offered for this problem. Descartes and Plato believed that the soul and body are two different substances and enjoy their own particular domains and features. Contemporary philosophers of the mind have also introduced a number of views in order to resolve the problems of substantial dualism. The theories of behaviorism and the identity of the mind and body deny the substantive nature of the soul and employ the words “mind” and “mental states” instead of the word “soul” and maintain that mental states are the same behavioral and brain-related states. However, while acknowledging the problems of dualism, the behavioral approaches, and the standpoint of the identity of the mind and brain, the advocates of functionalism provide an impartial interpretation of the mind (its being abstract or concrete) and believe that mental states are the same functional states which perform certain functional roles based on mental input and output and other mental states. Islamic philosophers and mutikallimun have also tackled the enigma of the soul and body and Plato’s substantial dualism. Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi deny the priority of the soul to the body (Platonic theory) but consider the essence of the soul and body to be immaterial and corporeal, respectively. Most mutikallimun reject the idea of the soul as an immaterial and self-subsistent substance and view it as a delicate kind of body. In line with functionalists, Mulla Sadra was well aware of the problems associated with considering the soul as an immaterial or corporeal substance and argued that the essence of the soul is not purely immaterial or material; rather, it is initially corporeal and then becomes immaterial through trans-substantial motion. He also stated that, based on the shadowy true unity, the soul is an intermediate world inclusive of both materiality and immateriality and becomes material and immaterial based on the states of its grades. Although both functionalists and Mulla Sadra reject the mind’s (the soul in Mulla Sadra’s view) being purely immaterial or corporeal, Mulla Sadra provided a more accurate explanation of the body-soul relation in comparison to functionalists, who hold a physicalist view of the mind. This is because he does not limit being exclusively to nature. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

8 - A Comparative Study of the Proofs of the Immateriality of the Soul in Demonstrating Imaginal Immateriality in the Views of Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadrā
Ahmad Abedi Arani Mohammad Reza Karimi Vala Mohsen Pirhadi

One of the main proofs demonstrating the subsistence of the soul is the immateriality of the soul. However, solving the dilemma of the subsistence of all human souls depends on the analysis of the quality of the immateriality of the soul and demonstrating imaginal immat More

One of the main proofs demonstrating the subsistence of the soul is the immateriality of the soul. However, solving the dilemma of the subsistence of all human souls depends on the analysis of the quality of the immateriality of the soul and demonstrating imaginal immateriality. Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī has tried to prove the immateriality of the soul and has essentially propounded immateriality as an argument for demonstrating the subsistence of the soul. Although he has not referred to the demonstration of imaginal immateriality, some of the proofs he presents have the potential to be used in proving this kind of immateriality. On the other hand, he believes that the souls which have reached the level of rational immateriality also enjoy imaginal immateriality. Mullā Ṣadrā has also demonstrated the rational and imaginal types of immateriality in order to solve the problem of the subsistence of all souls and, basically, his attempts at demonstrating imaginal immateriality were at the service of demonstrating the subsistence of all souls. Some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s proofs are similar to those of Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī. Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the application of some of these arguments to imaginal immateriality is perfect and, in addition to them, he also provides some independent reasons in order to demonstrate the rational and imaginal types of immateriality. Hence, through proving that the faculty of imagination is one of the levels of the soul and an immaterial thing by itself, he has managed to reason for the subsistence of the souls which have not moved forward from the level of imaginal immateriality. Here, the authors state that the arguments propounded by Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī are capable of demonstrating imaginal immateriality and, accordingly, as Mullā Ṣadrā indicates, the subsistence of all human souls is possible in the light of demonstrating the imaginal immateriality of the soul. This has been clearly explained based on Sadrian principles; nevertheless, before Mullā Ṣadrā and in Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī’s studies, imaginal immateriality can only be witnesses in those souls which have reached the level of rational immateriality. This argument cannot solve the problem of the subsistence of all human souls. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

9 - A Comparison of the Body-Soul Relationship in Philosophical Behaviorism and Sadrian Philosophy
Naeimeh Najmi Nejad Morteza Rezaee

20.1001.1.15600874.1400.27.2.6.4

The discussion of the relationship between the soul and body has always been a challenging problem. The most important problem with this discussion is the quality of the relationship between the soul as an immaterial existence with the body as a material existence. Many More

The discussion of the relationship between the soul and body has always been a challenging problem. The most important problem with this discussion is the quality of the relationship between the soul as an immaterial existence with the body as a material existence. Many thinkers have presented some theories in response to this problem. Following a descriptive-analytic approach, the present study examines and compares behaviorism, which provides some of the important theories in the philosophy of the mind, with the view of Mullā Ṣadrā as the most prominent Islamic Philosopher. The findings of the study indicate that both behaviorist and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in the oneness of the soul and body. However, behaviorists conceive of the soul and mental states as nothing but external human behavior. This approach in fact rejects the immateriality of the soul and its mental states, while Mullā Ṣadrā considers the relationship between the body and the soul as integration through unification based on some of his own principles including the graded trans-substantial motion and the soul’s corporeal origination. In his view, the soul, while being a single substance, enjoys both a material and corporeal level and different levels of immateriality – including Ideal and rational types – because of its graded nature. In other words, there is a single conjunctive truth that appears in the form of the body at lower levels and as the soul at higher levels. Manuscript profile

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10 - Mullā Ṣadrā’s View of the Potentials originating in Man’s Rational Immateriality: Factors and Obstacles
Najimeh Mansouri Furugh al-Sadat Rahimpoor Jafar Shanazari

20.1001.1.15600874.1401.27.3.4.8

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, the soul can attain some kinds of immateriality, which can lead to the development of specific features and capabilities for human beings. The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s analysis of the quality of the soul’s attainment of different l More

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, the soul can attain some kinds of immateriality, which can lead to the development of specific features and capabilities for human beings. The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s analysis of the quality of the soul’s attainment of different levels of rational immateriality, the influential factors in this process, the existing obstacles there, and the characteristics created through this immateriality in worldly life. Upon the rational faculty’s reaching its habitual stage, the soul arrives at the borderline of rational immateriality, and utmost immateriality is gained at the level of acquired reason. The reinforcement of practical intellect, love, and prayer are among the factors affecting man’s reaching the different levels of rational immateriality. However, there are some obstacles to this process such as yielding to whims, committing sins, imitating others, and loving the world. At its lowest level, rational immateriality creates speech in human beings and makes it possible for them to distinguish between the good and evil. Through the promotion of the level of immateriality, man can consciously try to begin their journey toward God and, at the highest level, they become qualified for the station of guardianship. Given Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the quality of the rational immateriality of the soul, the philosophical explanation of some of the duties of the Prophet(ṣ), such as receiving revelation and developing certainty about its legitimacy, becomes possible. Manuscript profile

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11 - A Critical Evaluation of Descartes’ Theory of Animal Mind Based on Sadrian Philosophy
Armin Mansouri Habibullah Danesh Shahraki zahra khazaie

20.1001.1.15600874.1401.27.4.5.1

Immaterial spiritual life for animals and their possession of mental capabilities have always been a controversial topic for debate among philosophers. The existence of certain similarities between animals and human beings, irrespective of all their differences, has mad More

Immaterial spiritual life for animals and their possession of mental capabilities have always been a controversial topic for debate among philosophers. The existence of certain similarities between animals and human beings, irrespective of all their differences, has made it difficult to provide an accurate explanation of the quality of animal life. Given his belief in the existence of two corporeal and immaterial intellectual substances for human beings, Descartes negates the existence of thought and intellection in animals for three reasons: lack of language, lack of creativity, and lack of awareness in animals. In other words, he only accepts the existence of corporeal life for animals and, thus, views animals as complex machines that lack mental life. This idea of Descartes is known as the “animal machine” notion. However, Mullā Ṣadrā analyzes animals in relation to the three material, Ideal, and intellectual levels of the world. Accordingly, he believes in the ideal immateriality of animal souls and explains mindfulness at the animal level based on this belief. Descartes’ animal machine hypothesis and the related three reasons are rejected based on the Ideal immateriality that Mullā Ṣadrā proves for animal souls. Manuscript profile

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12 - A Comparative Judgement of the Views and Principles of Mullā Ṣadrā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī on the Problem of Corporeal Resurrection
Seyyed Ali Razizadeh Seyyed Abbas Zahabi

20.1001.1.15600874.1401.28.1.1.4

Both Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in corporeal resurrection; however, they follow different approaches in this regard. A comparison of their views shows similarities in some of their principles but fundamental differences in some others. The origin of their More

Both Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in corporeal resurrection; however, they follow different approaches in this regard. A comparison of their views shows similarities in some of their principles but fundamental differences in some others. The origin of their difference is their philosophical principles and, particularly, the discussions of “identical restoration of the non-existent” and “immateriality of faculties”. The rational demonstration of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s corporeal resurrection was based on his belief in identity with the identical restoration of the non-existent, which has led to some incorrect conclusions such as the materiality of the immaterial dimensions of the soul in the process of resurrection. On the other hand, in contrast to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim as to philosophers’ lack of belief in corporeal resurrection, Mullā Ṣadrā tried to prove it philosophically for the first time. Although his philosophical approach gave rise to some criticisms against him, the same approach was the secret behind his immunity against repeating the same mistakes committed by mutikallimun, including Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the theory of the restoration of the non-existent and believed in other worldly and not elemental corporeal resurrection. Therefore, to demonstrate the restoration of individuals’ acts, he did not have to resort to mutikallimun’s theory of the “return of dispersed components” of human beings. One of the other differences between the views of these two philosophers concerns the problem of the multiplicity and immateriality of faculties. Both thinkers believed in the immateriality of the soul, but Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī maintained that soulish faculties lack multiplicity and tried to bring it in line with the idea of the identical restoration of the non-existent. However, Mullā Ṣadrā believed that the solution to the problem of corporeal resurrection, similar to many other problems, must be sought in the specific method of the soul’s knowledge, particularly, the immateriality of imagination. This paper aims to explain and evaluate the fundamental differences between the views of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā regarding the problem of corporeal resurrection. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

13 - A Comparison of the Immateriality of Sensory and Imaginal Perceptions with the Growing Block View of Time
Mahdi Assadi

20.1001.1.15600874.1402.28.4.3.6

One of the important problems that has remained untouched in Sadrian philosophy is the growing block view of time. On the basis of the growing view of time is the non-existence of future, while the past and present have their fixed places. Muslim philosophers have not d More

One of the important problems that has remained untouched in Sadrian philosophy is the growing block view of time. On the basis of the growing view of time is the non-existence of future, while the past and present have their fixed places. Muslim philosophers have not directly addressed this idea; however, it seems to be necessary for demonstrating some statements of Sadrian philosophers about the immateriality of sensory and imaginal perceptions and memory. When we perceive something using our senses or imagination, the perception remains in our mind exactly in the same way that it had appeared. This paper is intended to illustrate that this view is, in fact, unrelated to immateriality and, in case of admissibility of its arguments, can only prove the growing block view of time. In line with this approach, the author has critically examined the literature on this theory in pre-Sadrian philosophers, particularly Suhrawardī’s claim as to attributing the idea of the growing block to some thinkers. Suhrawardī maintains that, as each of the motions has come into existence, so the whole of the motions have come into existence, and they are together in existence. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

14 - Effects of Ideal Immateriality in Islamic Philosophy
Shahabbodin Vahidi Mehrjardy Ehsan Kordi Ardakani Vahid Gerami

20.1001.1.15600874.1402.29.2.2.4

A significant problem in Islamic philosophy is investigating the various dimensions and aspects of immateriality in the view of philosophers. One of the most important problems in the discussion of immateriality is the acceptance or rejection of Ideal immateriality, whi More

A significant problem in Islamic philosophy is investigating the various dimensions and aspects of immateriality in the view of philosophers. One of the most important problems in the discussion of immateriality is the acceptance or rejection of Ideal immateriality, which has been one of the major concerns of Islamic philosophers in the course of history. Among them, Peripatetic philosophers accepted the world of intellects and rational immateriality by denying the Ideal world and Ideal immateriality and considered the faculty of imagination to be material. However, Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā tried to demonstrate the Ideal world based on their own philosophical principles. Suhrawardī believed in the disjunctive Ideal world, while Mullā Ṣadrā believed in the connected Ideal world and the immateriality of the faculty of imagination in addition to the disconnected Ideal world. The present study aims to examine the effects of Ideal immateriality in Islamic philosophy and its role in resolving philosophical intricate problems. Here, the authors have investigated eleven effects of Ideal immateriality in different philosophical fields including the resurrection of incomplete and average souls; lack of the need to study the spheres and accepting reincarnation in the discussion of resurrection; demonstration of corporeal resurrection; a correct and rational interpretation of vanity of sin, immateriality of animals’ souls and their resurrection; subsistence of particular perceptions after death; the link between the world of intellects and the material world; an accurate interpretation of the Holy Prophet’s dreams, unveilings, and ascent; a correct interpretation of the state of death, purgatory, and the hereafter; the interpretation of jinn in Illuminationist philosophy, and the subsistence of issuing forms for the soul. Manuscript profile

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