List of Articles من

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  1 - Principiality of Existence and Change in the Logic of Definition
  Musa  Malayeri
  One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divide More

  One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divided into term and description. After Aristotle, the logic of definition was accepted by philosophers and logicians in its same primary form for a long period. Muslim Peripatetics followed almost the same trend until, in the course of the development of philosophy in the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra established the School of the Transcendent Philosophy through explaining and demonstrating the principiality of existence as well as developing some other ontological principles. One of the specific features of the Transcendent Philosophy was to harshly challenge the ontological bases of the logic of definition. Based on the theory of the principiality of existence, quiddities which, according to early philosophers, represent the objective reality of things, are reduced to mental concepts, and existence, which is the objective reality of things, cannot be perceived unless through direct observation. On the other hand, in this system, differentia, which is the basis of each quiddity and is considered to be the whole truth and actuality of each object, is not a quiddative thing and cannot be known through quiddative concepts. In this way, the basis of the five universals as the underlying foundation of the logic of definition became unstable. Following such changes, we expect to witness a fundamental review of Aristotelian logic and, particularly, of the concept of definition therein. The outcome of this overall change would be nothing but attaching more importance to the conceptual definition of truths, which is one of the significant consequences of the theory of the principiality of existence. Manuscript profile
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  2 - The Relationship between Poetry and Logic in Ibn Sina
  Ebrahim  Bazargani
  In the view of Muslim philosophers, the art of poetry not only enjoys a logical nature in Islamic philosophy but also constitutes the basis of the philosophy of art. One of the important questions in the realms of poetry and logic addresses the reason for exploring poet More

  In the view of Muslim philosophers, the art of poetry not only enjoys a logical nature in Islamic philosophy but also constitutes the basis of the philosophy of art. One of the important questions in the realms of poetry and logic addresses the reason for exploring poetry as a part of the nine-part logic and then abandoning it in two-part logics and being content with a minimum study of this art by Ibn Sina under the title of imaginal matters (mukhayyalat). Ibn Sina does not follow a consistent process in this regard in his various works and gradually leaves aside certain parts, including the art of poetry. This paper aims to investigate the methodological relationship between logic and poetry based on their definitions and, then, examine and clarify Ibn Sina’s strategies for joining poetry to logic. Manuscript profile
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  3 - A Critical Analysis of Abdulrazzaq Lahiji’s View of the World of Suspended Ideas
  Zakaria  Baharnezhad
  Believing or not believing in the world of suspended Ideas is one of the philosophical problems which affects philosophers’ approaches and methods in conducting their studies. Hence, it is necessary to examine this problem more profoundly following a new approach and be More

  Believing or not believing in the world of suspended Ideas is one of the philosophical problems which affects philosophers’ approaches and methods in conducting their studies. Hence, it is necessary to examine this problem more profoundly following a new approach and benefitting from original and authentic sources. In the same vein, the present paper is intended to, firstly, present a clear picture of the “world of suspended Ideas” and its difference from “Platonic Ideas” in Suhrawardi’s view. Next, the author explains Hakim Abdulrazzaq Lahiji’s view of Suhrawardi’s world of suspended Ideas and presents his critique in this regard. Finally, he tries to respond to Lahiji’s criticisms. The author does not believe that he has covered all the details with respect to the theme of this paper; however, he can claim that no reliable research or critical study has ever been conducted on Hakim Lahiji’s view of the theory of suspended Ideas. Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, the theologian philosopher, provided some responses to Lahiji’s criticisms in his book of Asrar al-hikam; nevertheless, his responses are not conclusive, and they are very difficult to understand. It is hoped that this study opens the way for a new series of research activities in this regard. The author also hopes that future studies on the world of suspended Ideas will not suffer from the potential deficits of this study. Manuscript profile
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  4 - Secrets of Sharī‘ah and Benefits of Obedience in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View
  Seyyed Mostafa  Muhaqqiq Damad
  According to religious teachings, religious rites and rituals, in addition to their external image, possess an internal image which creates Man’s identity and soul. In Islamic traditions, several works have been written on the secrets of Sharīa‘ah, some of which discuss More

  According to religious teachings, religious rites and rituals, in addition to their external image, possess an internal image which creates Man’s identity and soul. In Islamic traditions, several works have been written on the secrets of Sharīa‘ah, some of which discuss them in general and some analyze specific rites and rituals. In this regard, reference can be made to al-Futūḥāt al-makkīyyah by Ibn ‘Arabī, Asrār al-sharī‘ah wa aṭwār al-tarīqah wal-ḥaqīqah by Sayyid Haydar Amuli, Mahajjat-al-bayḍā by Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī, treatise of al-Tanbihāt al-‘aliyyah ala waza’if al-ṣalāt al-qalbīyyah by Shahīd Thānī, and Asrār al-ṣalāt by Imam Khomeini. In two parts of the book al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīyyah fil manahij al-sulukīyyah, Mullā Ṣadrā has also discussed the secrets of Sharī‘ah. The present paper investigates and analyses his views regarding the secrets of Sharī‘ah. Manuscript profile
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  5 - “I” and the Criterion for its Distinction from “others” in Suhrawardī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and Descartes
  Sakineh Gharibi Sohrab Haghighat mansour  Imanpour
  20.1001.1.15600874.1400.26.4.6.5
  The present study discusses the identity and referent of “I” and the criterion for distinguishing “true I” from the other in the views of Suhrawardī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and Descartes. According to these three philosophers, “I” is the external and self-revealing identity that More

  The present study discusses the identity and referent of “I” and the criterion for distinguishing “true I” from the other in the views of Suhrawardī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and Descartes. According to these three philosophers, “I” is the external and self-revealing identity that Man learns about through presential knowledge. The referent of true I in Suhrawardī’s view is immaterial light, which enjoys continuous self-awareness through the permanent manifestation of essence. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, referent is a level of existence which is continually in a state of change in the cradle of the trans-substantial motion; it is a graded realm with no fixed identity. For Descartes, the referent is an immaterial dimension that is continually involved in a state of thinking. Therefore, all three philosophers believe that true “I” is in fact a perceptive, knowledgeable, and thinking “I”. The distinction criterion for true I is also the same for all of them. This is because Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā consider continuous knowledge and not neglecting the self, which is the same as self-awareness, to be the distinction criterion for true I. However, Descartes’ criterion is clarity and distinction, which seem to be the same thing that Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā call continuous presence or self-awareness. Hence, it seems that the distinction criterion for “true I” is the same in the view of all the three philosophers. Manuscript profile