List of Articles عقلي

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  1 - A Response to an Old Problem about Mulla Sadra’s Encounter with Suhrawardi’s Arguments on Denying the Pre-Existence of the Soul
  Ali  Shirvani Mojtaba  Afsharpour
  There are some disagreements among philosophers on the pre-existence of the soul, that is, the existence of the soul before joining the body, whether it is originated or pre-eternal. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul – the soul qua soul – originates in the trans-subst More

  There are some disagreements among philosophers on the pre-existence of the soul, that is, the existence of the soul before joining the body, whether it is originated or pre-eternal. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul – the soul qua soul – originates in the trans-substantial motion of the body (corporeal origination) through particular individuation. However, he agrees with its pre-existence and considers it to be a rational one. When discussing this issue, he investigates, criticizes, and rejects Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying pre-existence. The commentators of Mulla Sadra’s words have always asked the question of why he did not agree with Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying the soul’s pre-existence based on his own particular individuation so that they would appear unanimous with respect to this problem. At least, this is what one could understand from Suhrawardi’s words and arguments. Accordingly, some of the early and contemporary commentators criticized him and believed that his objections to Suhrawardi’s words were unfounded. In this paper, while briefly referring to the fundamental principles of Suhrawardi’s arguments and Mulla Sadra’s related criticisms, the writers explain the main reason why Mulla Sadra refused to accept Suhrawardi’s view about the pre-existence of the soul. Manuscript profile
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  2 - Transformation of the Problem of “the Universal and the Particular” in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy of Principiality of Existence
  Mohammad Hosseinzadeh
  One of the logical discussions which undergoes serious changes by accepting the principiality of existence is the problem of “the universal and the particular”. In the light of the principiality of existence and its ramifications, Mulla Sadra transformed the theory of a More

  One of the logical discussions which undergoes serious changes by accepting the principiality of existence is the problem of “the universal and the particular”. In the light of the principiality of existence and its ramifications, Mulla Sadra transformed the theory of all philosophers in this regard and reconstructed this problem in accordance to the principles of his own ontological philosophy. In his view, the criterion for universality is the intellectual existence, and the criterion for particularity is the particular, physical, and ideal existence. The known has to be abstracted from the particular, physical, and ideal existence in order to reach the level of universality. This abstraction is a truth different from the superficial abstract of other philosophers and can be called “promotional abstraction”. Mulla Sadra believes that the famous problem of the “gathering of universality and particularity” cannot be resolved based on the principles of other philosophers, whereas it is possible to do so on the basis of his philosophy. Moreover, he maintains that commonality means the ontological relation of an intellectual existent to individuals and not the potential presence of quiddity in them. Manuscript profile
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  3 - A Study of the Relationship between the World of Pre-Existence and Platonic Ideas in Mulla Sadra
  Ali Muhammed  Sajedi
  According to al-I‘raf Chapter: 172 of the Qur’an, known as verse of Mithaq (pledge), before his presence in this world, man had witnessed in an immaterial, simple, and all-intuitive realm some pure truths, following which he acknowledged the divinity of his God. However More

  According to al-I‘raf Chapter: 172 of the Qur’an, known as verse of Mithaq (pledge), before his presence in this world, man had witnessed in an immaterial, simple, and all-intuitive realm some pure truths, following which he acknowledged the divinity of his God. However, after his fall in the human world and attachment to the body and cover of nature, he buried those pure jewels in worldly oblivion. This point is manifested in the works of Plato, the Greek divine philosopher, in his theory of the “Ideas” and the “theory of reminiscence”. The question rising here is: Can we find a relationship between the world of pledge (world of pre-existence) and Platonic Ideas, which have played an important role in explaining the differentiated knowledge of Almighty Truth of other than Him? The present research investigates the view of Mulla Sadra, the founder of the Transcendent Philosophy, in this regard following a descriptive-analytic method and intends to provide his response to the above question. In his view, the quality of man’s presence in that world was like the presence of his soul (spirit) in the world of intellects or the world of divine knowledge before its attachment to the body. At this level of being, he enjoys intellectual unity and all particular plural souls in an epitomized and simple form. Therefore, in Mulla Sadra’s view, the world of pre-existence is the divine area (world of divine knowledge). Based on this idea, he justifies the theory of reminiscence and equates the world of pledge with Platonic Ideas. It is necessary to note that Mulla Sadra initially explains the theory of Platonic Ideas based on his own philosophical principles (particularly the principles of the principiality, unity, and gradedness of being) and then, as discussed in this paper, confirms it as an indication of the world of pre-existence. Manuscript profile
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  4 - A Comparative Study of the Proofs of the Immateriality of the Soul in Demonstrating Imaginal Immateriality in the Views of Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadrā
  Ahmad Abedi Arani Mohammad Reza  Karimi Vala Mohsen  Pirhadi
  One of the main proofs demonstrating the subsistence of the soul is the immateriality of the soul. However, solving the dilemma of the subsistence of all human souls depends on the analysis of the quality of the immateriality of the soul and demonstrating imaginal immat More

  One of the main proofs demonstrating the subsistence of the soul is the immateriality of the soul. However, solving the dilemma of the subsistence of all human souls depends on the analysis of the quality of the immateriality of the soul and demonstrating imaginal immateriality. Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī has tried to prove the immateriality of the soul and has essentially propounded immateriality as an argument for demonstrating the subsistence of the soul. Although he has not referred to the demonstration of imaginal immateriality, some of the proofs he presents have the potential to be used in proving this kind of immateriality. On the other hand, he believes that the souls which have reached the level of rational immateriality also enjoy imaginal immateriality. Mullā Ṣadrā has also demonstrated the rational and imaginal types of immateriality in order to solve the problem of the subsistence of all souls and, basically, his attempts at demonstrating imaginal immateriality were at the service of demonstrating the subsistence of all souls. Some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s proofs are similar to those of Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī. Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the application of some of these arguments to imaginal immateriality is perfect and, in addition to them, he also provides some independent reasons in order to demonstrate the rational and imaginal types of immateriality. Hence, through proving that the faculty of imagination is one of the levels of the soul and an immaterial thing by itself, he has managed to reason for the subsistence of the souls which have not moved forward from the level of imaginal immateriality. Here, the authors state that the arguments propounded by Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī are capable of demonstrating imaginal immateriality and, accordingly, as Mullā Ṣadrā indicates, the subsistence of all human souls is possible in the light of demonstrating the imaginal immateriality of the soul. This has been clearly explained based on Sadrian principles; nevertheless, before Mullā Ṣadrā and in Muḥaqqiq Ṭūsī’s studies, imaginal immateriality can only be witnesses in those souls which have reached the level of rational immateriality. This argument cannot solve the problem of the subsistence of all human souls. Manuscript profile
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  5 - Listener (Locus of Manifestation) and Source (Emanator) Intellects in Jawadi Amuli (with an Emphasis on Misbah Yazdi’s Views)
  Rohollah Adineh Roghayeh Mosavi
  20.1001.1.15600874.1400.27.1.4.0
  The discussion of intellectual perception and the quality of intellection holds an important place in epistemology. Islamic philosophers have followed various approaches to explaining the mechanism of intellection. Mullā Ṣadrā has also used different expressions for cla More

  The discussion of intellectual perception and the quality of intellection holds an important place in epistemology. Islamic philosophers have followed various approaches to explaining the mechanism of intellection. Mullā Ṣadrā has also used different expressions for clarifying the process of general perception. He views the intellect sometimes as a locus of manifestation or epiphany (listener) and sometimes as an emanator (source) of intellectual forms. Accordingly, each of the researchers and commentators of Sadrian philosophy has tried to justify the differences between the words he has used in some way. As a neo-Sadrian philosopher, Jawadi Amuli posits some discussions in his works that can introduce a new view of the process of rational perception. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study demonstrates that, Jawadi Amuli has directly referred to two types of rational perception and the necessity to separate them from each other. In one of them, the intellect is a listener, and the general perception is the result of conscious rational intuition and passivity of the soul. Here, perception is limited to a special group. In the other one, the intellect functions as a source, and the general perception is the outcome of mental and soulish activities. All people are capable of this kind of intellectual perception. Manuscript profile
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  6 - Mullā Ṣadrā’s View of the Potentials originating in Man’s Rational Immateriality: Factors and Obstacles
  Najimeh Mansouri Furugh al-Sadat  Rahimpoor Jafar  Shanazari
  20.1001.1.15600874.1401.27.3.4.8
  In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, the soul can attain some kinds of immateriality, which can lead to the development of specific features and capabilities for human beings. The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s analysis of the quality of the soul’s attainment of different l More

  In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, the soul can attain some kinds of immateriality, which can lead to the development of specific features and capabilities for human beings. The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s analysis of the quality of the soul’s attainment of different levels of rational immateriality, the influential factors in this process, the existing obstacles there, and the characteristics created through this immateriality in worldly life. Upon the rational faculty’s reaching its habitual stage, the soul arrives at the borderline of rational immateriality, and utmost immateriality is gained at the level of acquired reason. The reinforcement of practical intellect, love, and prayer are among the factors affecting man’s reaching the different levels of rational immateriality. However, there are some obstacles to this process such as yielding to whims, committing sins, imitating others, and loving the world. At its lowest level, rational immateriality creates speech in human beings and makes it possible for them to distinguish between the good and evil. Through the promotion of the level of immateriality, man can consciously try to begin their journey toward God and, at the highest level, they become qualified for the station of guardianship. Given Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the quality of the rational immateriality of the soul, the philosophical explanation of some of the duties of the Prophet(ṣ), such as receiving revelation and developing certainty about its legitimacy, becomes possible. Manuscript profile
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  7 - Goodness of Justice: An Intellectual or Rational Theorem?
  Mohammad Imami حسین فرزانه
  20.1001.1.15600874.1401.28.1.2.5
  “Justice is good” and “cruelty is bad” are two of the most frequently used principles and propositions in various disciplines. Mutikallimun consider these two propositions to be rational, primary necessary, evident, certain, and needless of reasoning. However, some phil More

  “Justice is good” and “cruelty is bad” are two of the most frequently used principles and propositions in various disciplines. Mutikallimun consider these two propositions to be rational, primary necessary, evident, certain, and needless of reasoning. However, some philosophers deny their evidence and certainty and consider them as generally accepted propositions that bear no truth except for conforming to thinkers’ views. Certainty in relation to these two propositions means believing in the correctness of their use in arguments and production of scientific results, and indemonstrability refers to their dialectical application. Some believe that the indemonstrability in the interpretation of such propositions would undermine the basis of moral propositions. The question here is why there is so much controversy about these two apparently evident propositions. The findings of this descriptive-analytic study reveal that the solution must be found in distinguishing between “intellectual goodness” and “rational goodness”. When these two propositions are considered as individual intellectual propositions, they are hypothetical and genetic judgments; however, at a rational social level, they are evident and, of course, mentally posited and, unlike the general view of logicians, they must be viewed as certain propositions (not as generally accepted ones). In addition, some statements such as “They have no basis but popularity”, which are used by some philosophers and logicians about the two propositions, are not used to deny their reality. Rather, they are intended to deny the evidence and necessity of these two propositions in intellectual analyses. Thus, no damage is done to their support for moral propositions. Manuscript profile