Goodness of Justice: An Intellectual or Rational Theorem?
Subject Areas : Studies on Islamic philosophy and wisdomمحمد امامی 1 * , حسین فرزانه 2
1 -
2 -
Keywords:
Abstract :
“Justice is good” and “cruelty is bad” are two of the most frequently used principles and propositions in various disciplines. Mutikallimun consider these two propositions to be rational, primary necessary, evident, certain, and needless of reasoning. However, some philosophers deny their evidence and certainty and consider them as generally accepted propositions that bear no truth except for conforming to thinkers’ views. Certainty in relation to these two propositions means believing in the correctness of their use in arguments and production of scientific results, and indemonstrability refers to their dialectical application. Some believe that the indemonstrability in the interpretation of such propositions would undermine the basis of moral propositions. The question here is why there is so much controversy about these two apparently evident propositions. The findings of this descriptive-analytic study reveal that the solution must be found in distinguishing between “intellectual goodness” and “rational goodness”. When these two propositions are considered as individual intellectual propositions, they are hypothetical and genetic judgments; however, at a rational social level, they are evident and, of course, mentally posited and, unlike the general view of logicians, they must be viewed as certain propositions (not as generally accepted ones). In addition, some statements such as “They have no basis but popularity”, which are used by some philosophers and logicians about the two propositions, are not used to deny their reality. Rather, they are intended to deny the evidence and necessity of these two propositions in intellectual analyses. Thus, no damage is done to their support for moral propositions.