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        1 - Principiality of Existence and Change in the Logic of Definition
        Musa  Malayeri
        One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divide More
        One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divided into term and description. After Aristotle, the logic of definition was accepted by philosophers and logicians in its same primary form for a long period. Muslim Peripatetics followed almost the same trend until, in the course of the development of philosophy in the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra established the School of the Transcendent Philosophy through explaining and demonstrating the principiality of existence as well as developing some other ontological principles. One of the specific features of the Transcendent Philosophy was to harshly challenge the ontological bases of the logic of definition. Based on the theory of the principiality of existence, quiddities which, according to early philosophers, represent the objective reality of things, are reduced to mental concepts, and existence, which is the objective reality of things, cannot be perceived unless through direct observation. On the other hand, in this system, differentia, which is the basis of each quiddity and is considered to be the whole truth and actuality of each object, is not a quiddative thing and cannot be known through quiddative concepts. In this way, the basis of the five universals as the underlying foundation of the logic of definition became unstable. Following such changes, we expect to witness a fundamental review of Aristotelian logic and, particularly, of the concept of definition therein. The outcome of this overall change would be nothing but attaching more importance to the conceptual definition of truths, which is one of the significant consequences of the theory of the principiality of existence. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Essentialism in the Transcendent Philosophy: Principles and Concomitants
        Mohammad Nejati Mostafa  Momeni Faroogh  Touli
        Essentialism indicates the independence of external objects from human interests and perceptions. In Islamic philosophy, based on an affirmative approach, objects are generally considered to be a collection of essential and accidental attributes which are independent fr More
        Essentialism indicates the independence of external objects from human interests and perceptions. In Islamic philosophy, based on an affirmative approach, objects are generally considered to be a collection of essential and accidental attributes which are independent from human thought. This problem has two major dimensions in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. In his own general approach, based on the common tradition of philosophers, particularly Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā also maintains that external objects are independent from human perception and consist of a series of essential and accidental attributes. Following a specific approach, Mullā Ṣadrā limits the essence of external objects to the single and unique truth of existence while emphasizing the ontological independence of external objects and based on the ontological and epistemological principles of his own philosophy. Moreover, through negating any kind of external origin for essential and accidental components as well as all quiddative consequents, he believes that existents’ possible synthesis of matter and form or genus and differentia is related to the world of the mind and subcategorized under the soul’s power of creativity. Manuscript profile
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        3 - An Analysis of the Double-Sided Divisions of Existence based on Sadrian Philosophical System
        Abdolal Shokr
        One of the principles of existence is its commensurability with actuality, externality, and unity. Accordingly, the problem is that this commensurability requires the other divisions, i.e., potential, mental, and multiple types of existence, to exit its domain of divisi More
        One of the principles of existence is its commensurability with actuality, externality, and unity. Accordingly, the problem is that this commensurability requires the other divisions, i.e., potential, mental, and multiple types of existence, to exit its domain of divisions. Later philosophers have tried to resolve this problem by adding two soulish and relative values. Regarding the soulish value, the actuality, unity, and externality of an existent are considered without comparing it to other existents, thus existence becomes commensurate with actuality, unity, and objectivity. Regarding the relative aspect, existences are compared to other existences, find their place in the division, and become the divided of the side in front of it. However, there is another problem because, based on the second assumption, the other side will not be compatible with the meaning of the divisions being the divided. This is because the divisions are separate from each other and have nothing in common; otherwise, the division would be meaningless. Apparently, this problem arises when dealing with the principiality of being and quiddity and ontological separation because the first division has been formed based on the philosophical system of early philosophers and is compatible with its fundamental principles. Following a comparative analytic method of content analysis, the present paper examines the roots of the changes in the double-sided divisions of existence and demonstrates that they were initially developed in the works of philosophers before Mullā Ṣadrā without taking the problem of the principiality of existence into consideration. However, they were later reinterpreted on the basis of this principle and, thus, created this problem. An analysis of this problem based on Sadrian principles could lead to an acceptable justification in this regard. Manuscript profile
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        4 - The Other and Individuation in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophy
        Zahra  Karimi Majid Ziaei Ghahnavieh Alireza  Hasanpour
        The problem of other was propounded for the first time in Western philosophy by Emmanuel Levinas and its efficiency in justifying several ethical principles is undeniable. Moreover, it seems that the majority of present issues and complications in social and internation More
        The problem of other was propounded for the first time in Western philosophy by Emmanuel Levinas and its efficiency in justifying several ethical principles is undeniable. Moreover, it seems that the majority of present issues and complications in social and international relationships can be resolved through a profound consideration of this problem. This discussion has apparently been developed during the contemporary period; however, several early philosophical views and ideas are also capable of resolving the related issues. One of the early philosophical schools with such a potential is Mullā Ṣadrā’s school of thought, which comprises the principles that are based on his ontological thoughts. The employment of the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy as a method of living can at least lead to some changes in People’s worldviews. For example, by lining up some philosophical principles such as the principiality and gradation of existence and the theory of existents’ manifestation, a new definition can be provided for the principle of individuation. Moreover, through a comparison of the principle of individuation with the Sadrian oneness of being, a number of noteworthy conclusions can be derived from this discussion. Manuscript profile
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        5 - Mullā Ṣadrā’s Strategies for Reducing Death Anxiety and its Philosophical Principles
        Manouchehr Shaminezhad Hossein Atrak Mohsen Jahed
        The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s strategies for treating death anxiety and its philosophical foundations. It also aims to suggest some philosophical and ontological strategies to decrease modern Man’s anxiety when thinking about death based on some of Mullā More
        The present study investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s strategies for treating death anxiety and its philosophical foundations. It also aims to suggest some philosophical and ontological strategies to decrease modern Man’s anxiety when thinking about death based on some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles, such as the principiality of existence, the union of the intellect with intelligible, the trans-substantial motion, theism, religiosity, and believing in the Hereafter. According to Sadrian philosophy, Man’s life is meaningful and purposeful, and being has been created based on divine emanation. The human soul is corporeally-originated; however, its essence changes because of its union with the intelligible and its own trans-substantial motion and attains higher levels of being though going through different existential grades. This developmental move continues until reaching the origin of being and does not end with death. It also grants meaning to Man’s life and decreases their death anxiety. Mullā Ṣadrā is an existential philosopher who advocates a supernaturalist, theistic, and procedural approach to death. The reality of death in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is a part of Man’s process of existential development. Some of the strategies that can be inferred from his philosophy to reduce death anxiety include following a teleological approach to the world, being’s view of God as pure connection, believing in the Hereafter and Man’s resurrection after corporeal death, advocating ontological evolution, and having a developmental view of death. Manuscript profile