List of articles (by subject) Philosophers and philosophical schools influencing the Transcendent Philosophy
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Open Access Article
1 - A Comparative Judgement of the Views and Principles of Mullā Ṣadrā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī on the Problem of Corporeal Resurrection
Seyyed Ali Razizadeh Seyyed Abbas ZahabiBoth Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in corporeal resurrection; however, they follow different approaches in this regard. A comparison of their views shows similarities in some of their principles but fundamental differences in some others. The origin of their MoreBoth Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in corporeal resurrection; however, they follow different approaches in this regard. A comparison of their views shows similarities in some of their principles but fundamental differences in some others. The origin of their difference is their philosophical principles and, particularly, the discussions of “identical restoration of the non-existent” and “immateriality of faculties”. The rational demonstration of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s corporeal resurrection was based on his belief in identity with the identical restoration of the non-existent, which has led to some incorrect conclusions such as the materiality of the immaterial dimensions of the soul in the process of resurrection. On the other hand, in contrast to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim as to philosophers’ lack of belief in corporeal resurrection, Mullā Ṣadrā tried to prove it philosophically for the first time. Although his philosophical approach gave rise to some criticisms against him, the same approach was the secret behind his immunity against repeating the same mistakes committed by mutikallimun, including Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the theory of the restoration of the non-existent and believed in other worldly and not elemental corporeal resurrection. Therefore, to demonstrate the restoration of individuals’ acts, he did not have to resort to mutikallimun’s theory of the “return of dispersed components” of human beings. One of the other differences between the views of these two philosophers concerns the problem of the multiplicity and immateriality of faculties. Both thinkers believed in the immateriality of the soul, but Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī maintained that soulish faculties lack multiplicity and tried to bring it in line with the idea of the identical restoration of the non-existent. However, Mullā Ṣadrā believed that the solution to the problem of corporeal resurrection, similar to many other problems, must be sought in the specific method of the soul’s knowledge, particularly, the immateriality of imagination. This paper aims to explain and evaluate the fundamental differences between the views of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā regarding the problem of corporeal resurrection. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
2 - Immutable Archetypes and their Place in Divine Apriori Knowledge in the Eyes of Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā
Amirhossein Kiani Zohreh Hosaini KhameneiThe notion of immutable archetypes is one of the most important pillars of Ibn ‘Arabī’s ontology, and its acceptance greatly influences one’s view of the problem of God’s knowledge. In fact, God’s knowledge prior to the creation of existents is an important challenge th MoreThe notion of immutable archetypes is one of the most important pillars of Ibn ‘Arabī’s ontology, and its acceptance greatly influences one’s view of the problem of God’s knowledge. In fact, God’s knowledge prior to the creation of existents is an important challenge that various epistemological, kalāmi, philosophical, and gnostic systems have tried to analyze and explain each in its own way. The Mu‘tazilites and Ibn ‘Arabī have tried to solve this problem by accepting the existence of pre-eternal archetypes. However, some thinkers, such as Mullā Ṣadrā, have disagreed with Ibn ‘Arabī’s view. Mullā Ṣadrā has harshly criticized the structure of immutable archetypes in his works. Nevertheless, through a more detailed investigation and based on a comparative approach, it can be concluded that Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to solve the problems that are in contrast to his philosophical principles through presenting a new view of the problem of archetypes and providing a new interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabī’s standpoint. This study aims to demonstrate that Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of immutable archetypes but differentiates between his view and the idea of the subsistence of non-existents, which is favored by the Mu‘tazilites. He also believes that the first view is in conformity with his own unveilings and intuitions. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
3 - A Study of Ibn Sīnā’s Argument on the Accidental Nature of Unity in Ilāhīyyāt al-Shifā’
Mihammadhadi TavakoliAccording to Aristotle, a number of philosophers in ancient Greece theorized that the “one” is an independent substance that performs a causal role in relation to other substances. Through clarifying the predicative nature of the “one” and referring to the false consequ MoreAccording to Aristotle, a number of philosophers in ancient Greece theorized that the “one” is an independent substance that performs a causal role in relation to other substances. Through clarifying the predicative nature of the “one” and referring to the false consequences of the above theory, he tried to reject it. Ibn Sīnā has extensively investigated the theory of the one’s being a substance and Aristotle’s related criticisms in the ilāhīyyāt section of al-Shifā’. Unlike Aristotle, he has not merely referred to the one’s being a predicate and, rather, through a lengthy and complex argument, has tried to demonstrate that unity, as the source of the derivation of the one, is a necessary accident. Ibn Sīnā’ argument is prone to criticism from different aspects, the most important of which is the confusion of categorical and analytic accidents with each other. Unity is merely an analytic accident, and Ibn Sīnā’s argument is incapable of demonstrating its being a categorical accident. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
4 - Problem of Attributing Quiddity to Existence in Seyyed Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī and an Evaluation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Narration of his Views
Seyyed Ahmad Hosseini SangchalSolving the problem of attributing quiddity to existence in Dashtakī’s view is intertwined with the theory of predication, derivative, and the principle of subordination. Through separating existence in the sense of being in existence and existence in the sense of exist MoreSolving the problem of attributing quiddity to existence in Dashtakī’s view is intertwined with the theory of predication, derivative, and the principle of subordination. Through separating existence in the sense of being in existence and existence in the sense of existent and distinguishing accidents by-themselves from mentally-posited accidents, Dashtakī has analyzed the problem of attribution in line with the pre-supposed elements. He agrees with the occurrence of existence to quiddity only in existence in the sense of existent in the mind. Mullā Ṣadrā has usually provided an incomplete narration of Dashtakī’s view of attribution, theory of predication, derivative, and the necessity of demonstrating the source of the predicate for the subject. In fact, he has explained all the related elements in one place. In his analysis of the subordination principle, he is completely influenced by Dashtakī. It seems that, in spite of his great efforts at providing a consistent narration of Dashtakī’s view, Mullā Ṣadrā has failed to present some elements consistently in his own theory. Manuscript profile