per Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-0530234articleسرمقالهS. Mohammad Khameneisiprin@mullasadra.org1رئیس بنیاد حکمت اسلامی صدرا، تهران، ایران<p>تاریخ چیزی جز مجموع رفتارهای جوامع بشری و واکنشهای روح جهان و بعبارتی، جمع جبری آندو، نیست. انسان در رفتارهای اجتماعی خود وقایعی را، اعم از خیر و شر، بُروز میدهد و جهان، که موجودی زنده و درّاک است، در برابر آن از خود واکنش نشان میدهد، که فرهنگ قرآنی به آن نام «تقدیر» داده است و از ارادة الهی برمیخیزد. پس جمع جبری کردارهای اجتماعات بشر و واکنشهای جهان قانونمند الهی ـ‌که گاه به آن دهر و زمانه میگویند‌ـ در طول زمان، همان تاریخ است. در موضوع وجود شرّ در جوامع بشری نیز گفته شده که شرّ عبارتست از رفتارهایی که از ناحیة بشر سر میزند و بر خلاف ساختار طبیعی او، یعنی قانون طبیعت باشد‎؛ ساختاری که بر اساس و پایة خیر و پیروی از قوانین خلقت، و قوانین اسلام، بنا شده و نام «فطرت» به آن داده¬اند. ولی گاه انسان بسبب داشتن اختیار، روش حیوانی را برمیگزیند و بجای رفتار خیرآمیز، رفتار و روشی ضد فطرت و شرارت‌آمیز در پیش میگیرد. تاریخ و جهان گذشته، انباشته از این شرارتها و جنایات بشر میباشد و در تاریخ معاصر و قرن حاضر نیز فراوان دیده میشوند. نمونه¬یی از این شرارتها، کردار نسل فاسد صهیونیستی میباشد که دست او از آستین آمریکا و انگلیس بیرون آمده و جنایات و نسل¬کشی و کشتار مردم بیگناه فلسطین را به آنجا رسانده که حتی وجدان جامعة جهانی را بیدار کرده است. اما خداوند متعال بر اساس آفرینش حکیمانة خود، روح جهان را آموخته است که چسان در هنگام خود، تقدیر الهی را که میزان و ترازوی عدل در جهان است، بکار بیندازد و جنایتکاران را کیفر دهد. از آن جمله، شکست و خواری نظام صهیونیستی اسرائیل است که مجبور به صلح خفّت¬بار در برابر گروه کوچک فلسطینیان غزّه شد و از طرفی دیگر، حامی جنایتکار او، یعنی آمریکا را، صحنة بلاهای آسمانی و آتش‌سوزی مهیب و طولانی ساخت که ضعف حکومت پوشالی آنرا نشان دهد. و «باش تا صبح دولت بدمد؛ کاین هنوز از نتایج سحر است»!</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/50206فلسفه تاریخ تقدیر شر بشری قانون حقوق بشر صهیونیسمper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-05302518articleA Critical Study of the Impact of Philosophical Views of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī of the Active Intellect on their Understanding of Qur’anic VersesAli Arshad Riyahiarshad@ltr.ui.ac.ir1Sajad Rahimisajadrahimi93@gmail.com2Professor at the Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom Department, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranMA in Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom Department, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran<p>In the philosophies of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī the Active Intellect is the last immaterial existent in the vertical chain of the intellects. The duty of this Intellect is to administer the lower world, create human souls, grant intelligibles to human beings, and, teach and issue the divine orders to the prophets. Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī, as two distinguished philosophers of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist Schools, respectively, have discussed this Being and His Attributes in their various works based on their own philosophical ideas. The views of these two philosophers regarding the Active Intellect have greatly influenced their understanding of Qur’anic verses and resulted in their presentation of philosophical or, in some cases, esoteric interpretations. This paper provides a critical analysis of the impact of the philosophical views of Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī of the Active Intellect on their understanding of the verses of the Qur’an. To accomplish this task, after examining all of their works, the authors have extracted the Qur’anic perceptions of these two philosophers, which have been influenced by their views of the Active Intellect, and explained the quality of their proofs. Next, they have critically examined the mentioned extractions based on their lexical meanings, science of interpretation, and the related philosophical views and traditional sciences comprehensively and concluded that most of their impressions are unacceptable.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/45028Ibn Sīnā Suhrawardī Active Intellect philosophical interpretation philosophical esoteric interpretationper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-053021934articleEnvironmental Ethics Based on Five Principles of Sadrian PhilosophyMehdi Bayatmokhtaribayatmokhtari@neyshabur.ac.ir1Mostafa Momeniesfad2003@yahoo.com2Associate Professor, University of Neyshabur, Neyshabur, IranAssociate Professor, Sabzevar University of Medical Sciences, Sabzevar, Iran<p>One of the most important challenges before contemporary Man is excessive use of natural resources. Technology is harshly destroying environmental elements, and industry has not only revealed Man’s lack of harmony with nature but also completely altered their metaphysical supremacy and is now threatening their health. The problem of environmental destruction and environmental ethics is a novel product of modern life; however, its principles can be inferred from some of the works of Islamic philosophers, particularly, Mullā Ṣadrā. Five principles in the Transcendent Philosophy could be considered efficient in this regard. According to the principiality of existence, the substance of the human soul and the substance of nature are two modes of the same single truth, and the pain of nature is followed by Man’s suffering. Based on the principle of the awareness and glorification of nature, nature is as respectable as a devout person. Moreover, as the principle of Man’s vicegerency suggests, since God is free from any kind of evil, His vicegerent should also perceive the relationship between nature and its true Owner, function as a good representative of His Beauty and Perfection, and glorify and preserve this manifestation of God to the best of their abilities. According to the principle of continuous creation, nature depends on God at every single moment and is illuminated by His Light, thus it does not deserve to be destroyed and abandoned. Finally, based on the fifth principle, Man acts based on their nature; blessed people lead nature towards heavenly forms, and malicious people lead it towards hellish forms. The first group are concerned about preserving nature, while the second group try to destroy it. In Islamic philosophy and, thus, the views of Islamic philosophers there is a right-duty relationship between Man and nature, according to which Man has the right to use nature conditionally and, at same time, has the duty of protecting and improving it.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/44803Mullā Ṣadrā Transcendent Philosophy Nature environment principiality of existence trans-substantial motionper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-053023552articleAn Epistemological Study of Graded Pleasure and Pain in Ibn Sīnā and Mullā ṢadrāAhmad Abesikarimiir@yahoo.com1Salman Shariatisalma66@chmail.ir2Associate Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, University of Qom, Qom, IranPhD Candidate of Islamic Philosophy and Kalm, University of Qom, Qom, Iran<p>Both Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā consider pleasure and pain to be of the type of perception. In Ibn Sīnā’s view, perception has three stages: sensory, imaginal, and intellectual. Thus pleasures and pains are settled at the same three levels. Similar to him, Mullā Ṣadrā believes in the trinity of perception and views estimative perception as a branch of intellectual perception and, thus, places estimative pleasure and pain under intellectual ones. There are some similarities and differences between the views of these two thinkers in this regard. Some of their most important shared views include the concomitance of accidents, the particularity of the sensory perceived thing, the particularity of the imaginal perceived thing, the immateriality of the rational faculties and its perceived things, the greater strength of imaginal pleasure and pain comparing to that of sensory ones and their being weaker than intellectual pleasure and pain. Among their most crucial differences, reference can be made to the following: 1) in Ibn Sīnā’s view, the levels of perception are actualized through the process of peeling and removal of additions, while in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view this occurs through promotion and attaining the quality of the modes of superior immaterial existents; 2) in Ibn Sīnā’s view, perceived things and sensory faculties are material, and the pleasure and pain at this level of perception are also material; however, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that sensory faculties and perceived things and, thus, their pleasure and pain are immaterial; 3) Ibn Sīnā’s image of the levels and grades of the pleasure and pain of perceptive faculties corresponds with the criterion of vertical gradedness, while Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the relationship between the grades such pleasure and pain is based on the gradedness of their manifestations.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/45319Pleasure pain levels of pleasure and pain sensory perception imaginal perception intellectual perceptionper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-053025366articleA Critique of the Super Intellectual Immateriality of the Rational Soul in the View of Ḥassanzādeh ĀmulīMahmud saidiym.saidiy@shahed.ac.ir1Associate Professor, Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom Department, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran<p>The Problem of the super intellectual immateriality of the rational soul was posed by Ḥakīm Sabziwārī for the first time, and Ḥassanzādeh Āmulī discussed and investigated it extensively later. Apparently, the philosophers after him did not emulate his endeavors in this regard. The middle term of all the arguments presented by Ḥassanzādeh Āmulī to demonstrate the level of super intellectual immateriality is the rational soul’s being unlimited and possessing infinite levels. The most important argument in favor of this claim include: the rational soul’s lack of quiddity, its trans-substantial motion, its reaching the level of heart and perceiving the universals, and its shadow-like true and rightful unity. Ḥassanzādeh Āmulī also refers to some of the narrated <em>ḥadiths</em> and statements of certain prominent philosopher in order to prove his claim. The boundlessness of the rational soul does not mean its lacking quiddity because any existent except for the Necessary Being is limited and finite. Because of its trans-substantial motion, the moving distance of the rational soul can be divided into an infinite number of limits, which fails to demonstrate the super intellectual immateriality and boundlessness of the rational soul. Moreover, due to the intellectual restriction of human perceptions into three levels of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual types, the realization of the super intellectual immateriality of an ontological or perceptive level is impossible.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/45862super intellectual immateriality Ḥassanzādeh Āmulī rational soul heart trans-substantial motionper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-053026784articleAn Analysis of Spiritualist Cinema in the Light of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Account of the World of MeaningReza Mesdaghi Baharirmb10001@gmail.com1Abdollah Salavatia.salavati@sru.ac.ir2Tajbakhsh Fanaeiant.fanaeian@yahoo.com3Alireza Darabidarabiar@yahoo.com4PhD candidate of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Faculty of Law, Theology, and Political Science, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran, IranAssociate Professor, Department of Theology and Islamic Teachings, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, IranAssociate Professor, Department of Performing Arts, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranAssistant professor, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Law, Theology, and Political Science, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran, Iran<p>In the course of history, art has always functioned as a tool for presenting human questions and a scene for posing philosophical discussions. Therefore, various schools have used art as a means of discovering the secrets of being in order to satiate the thirst of man’s knowledge-seeking intellect for the quality of displaying the manifestation of being. However, the art of today, while displaying visual manifestations, allows imagination flow and visualizes metaphysical and other-worldly concepts. The purpose of the present paper is to examine the ways the seventh art approaches immaterial worlds. To accomplish this task, the authors have tried to explore the world of meaning from the viewpoint of the Transcendent Philosophy in order to portray the mind’s processing of the soul’s imaginations based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in spiritualist cinema. The motive for this study was rooted in the necessity of presenting a model that could determine the borderline between right and wrong in the world of meaning and suggest a reliable philosophy on the meaning of the world to the addressees. Thus, the main question of this study is which facilities the world of meaning in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy could offer to spiritualist cinema. Accordingly, the Transcendent Philosophy can represent the world of meaning in the light of viewing the perfect man as the source of truth based on a cognitive approach to soulish perceptions of the worlds of matter, Ideas, and intellect. In this way, it would be possible to provide an original image of the duality of meaning and structure on the silver screen through a profound narration of the appearance of phenomena and a dynamic analysis of inner worlds.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/40753world of meaning cinema spiritualist Transcendent Philosophy Mullā Ṣadrāper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-0530285106articleA Study of the Dimensions of the Time-Motion Relation Based on the Views of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā ṢadrāMohammad Amin Afzalzadehafzalzadeh1@gmail.com1MA in Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Khorasan Seminary, Mashhad, Iran<p>Time is a quantity for the measurement of motion, and motion means the continuous move of a thing from potency to act, which is by itself divided into two types: mediating and cutting. Similar to time, cutting movement is unstable and adaptable to time. Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā share many of their views regarding time and motion. Both of them believe that the relationship between them is bilateral. On the one hand, time is ontologically dependent on motion and, on the other hand, it grants quantity to motion. Nevertheless, their final analyses of the truth of time are different from each other. Ibn Sīnā views time as a quantitative category and does not believe in the multiplicity of time based on the multiplicity of motions. He maintains that the origin of time is the rotational motion of the Earth and considers it as a criterion for the measurement of other motions. However, in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, time is the analytic accident of motion in the sense that time and motion are ontologically united with each other but are different in terms of their whatness. He also adds that time occurs to motion in mind. Based on his own particular method, Mullā Ṣadrā provides a new analysis of time, motion, and the relationship between them. He acknowledges that motion and time are among ontological affairs and philosophical secondary intelligibles. Moreover, time does not occur to motion in the outside world but they are both the moving modes of the same single thing. He considers a time for any motion while attributing the general time that happens in nature to the trans-substantial motion of the firmament. The purpose of this paper is to explore the idea that the difference between the conclusions of these two philosophers originates in their different views of time, motion, and the relationship between them.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/41793Time motion cutting motion mediating motionper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-05302107126articleAn Evaluation of the Possibility of Defending the Theory of the Objectivity of God’s Essence and Attributes Based on various Theories on the Ontology of FeaturesMostafa Iazidi Yazdanabadim.izadi371@gmail.com1Mohammadreza Bayatmz.bayat@ut.ac.ir2PhD candidate of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran<p>Explaining the relationship between God’s essence and attributes is one of the most fundamental problems in philosophy and <em>kalām</em>. The objectivity of essence and attributes is one of the most important theories that is used to explain their relationship, which is consistent with believing in God’s simplicity as the most crucial or, at least, as one of the most important metaphysical attributes of God. However, accepting the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes or His simplicity depends on the theory that is presented on the ontology of features and attributes. Several theories have been introduced in this regard in Islamic philosophy and contemporary analytic metaphysics. By discussing such theories, the present paper demonstrates the following points: 1) defending the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes is based on a theory on the ontology of attributes; 2) not all theories on ontological attributes are useful for explaining the objectivity of His essence and attributes; 3) the theories of Brian Leftow and Mullā Ṣadrā can be used to defend the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/46698God’s simplicity objectivity of essence and attributes ontology of attributes and features Brian Leftow Mullā Ṣadrāper Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Instituteخردنامه صدرا1560-08742676-53812025-05302127144articleA Comparison of the Concept of Death and Thanatopsis in Philosophies of Mīr Dāmād and Miguel de Unamuno Hossein Shamsh.shams@cfu.ac.ir1Assistant Professor, Department of Teaching Educational Sciences, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran<p>Thanatopsis has always been discussed alongside thinking about existence in different fields of philosophy. In other words, death is one of the oldest philosophical and gnostic problems that has been discussed by several philosophers and thinkers, each approaching it based on their own philosophical principles. This study has examined and compared the concept of death and thanatopsis in the philosophies of two prominent thinkers, Miguel de Unamuno and Mīr Dāmād. Evidently, each of them has a particular view in this regard based on his own specific philosophical system and school of thought. This analytic-comparative study has been carried out relying on library and research resources. Here, the author tries to respond to the question of what the meaning of death and thanatopsis in the philosophies of these two philosophers is. The findings indicate that, given the concepts of death and life, piety plays a central role in the philosophical and gnostic thoughts of both thinkers, and death is a metaphysical and ontological problem in their philosophies. Apparently, both of them believe that fear of death is an intrinsic problem that bothers all living things; nevertheless, this fear is moderated by man’s awareness of being and nature’s method of work. Accordingly, instead of viewing death as a purely destructive phenomenon, both of them consider it to be an affirmative affair.</p>http://kherad.mullasadra.org/Article/43748Philosophy gnosis Death thanatopsis Miguel de Unamuno Mīr Dāmād