Since Farabi’s time, the division of possible beings into quiddity and existence is considered to be the most important difference between them and the Necessary Being. Existence is neither identical with possible essence, nor one of its parts or effects. Accordingly, p
More
Since Farabi’s time, the division of possible beings into quiddity and existence is considered to be the most important difference between them and the Necessary Being. Existence is neither identical with possible essence, nor one of its parts or effects. Accordingly, possible beings consist of essence and existence, which occurs to it. Farabi was the first to propose an idea of the combination of existence and quiddity; an idea which does not clearly discriminate between the subject and the object. Apparently, Ibn Sina expanded the same view; however, there are some traces in his philosophy which can pave the way for moving from external accidence to analytic accidence. Commentators of Ibn Sina have presented different interpretations of his idea of the ontological relationship between existence and quiddity, two of the most important of which are the ones supported by Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra. In the interpretation favored by Suhrawardi, the relationship between existence and quiddity is similar to any other relationship between accidents and their subjects. However, in Mulla Sadra’s interpretation, the essential difference between existence and other accidents is greatly emphasized. Here, the relationship between existence and quiddity has been promoted from “affirmation of something for something” to the “affirmation of a thing” and, as a result, Suhrawardi’s objections to Ibn Sina are removed. In this paper, after presenting and demonstrating the presuppositions of Ibn Sina’s theory, the author refers to and examines the above-mentioned two interpretations.
Manuscript profile
